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PREFACE 
A large po.rtion- of the analyses of farm programs has heretofore 
been conducted .by means of a theoretical analysis. Few programs have 
been analyzed on.the basis of how farmers have actually participated or 
on the basis of .. their stated payment requirements •. A comparison of the 
results based :on -theoretical analysis and farmers' stated payment re-
quirements using the same programs and the same group of farms is rarer 
still. 
i 
This study ·is. composed of two parts. The first· par-t is concerned 
with a theor..et±ca.L analysis of alternative farm programs •. __ The. second 
part deals with. a:n. analysis. of. the same programs using the .. s.ta ted. pay-
ment requirements .of; farmers. The two analyses are compared .and con-, 
trasted. It :.is. hoped. that sufficient generalizations have been drawn 
from thel:2 programs studied to aid· in the evaluation of many additional 
program alternativ.es. - -
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Despite the rapid urbanization and industrialization of the United 
States as it enters the 1970's, farm policy is an issue in which every 
citizen has at least some stake. Farm policy is of concern to the 
farmer because it affects his very livelihood; it is of concern to the 
businessman because it affects his profit and loss statement; it is of 
concern to the consumer because it affects the costs of what he wears 
and eats; and it is of concern to the taxpayer as he looks for ways to 
·reduce Government costs. 
After .three and a half decades of extensive Government supply con-
trol programs, agriculture still has the capacity to overproduce and 
is still faced with painful and costly adjustments in resource use. 
Federal expenditures for supply control and income maintenance amount to 
over three billion dollars annually. There is an additional social cost 
resulting from the overcommitment of sources to farm production. 
In 1966, nearly 63 million acres of cropland were diverted from 
production under Government agricultural programs. It has been esti-
mated that if the present control programs ended, 40 to 50 million acres 
of this land would return to production of crops presently being con-
trolled. In addition there are up to 300 million additional acres of 
potential cropland that could be brought into production, if it were 
not for present acreage restrictions and if commodity prices were 
2 
1 favorable. It has also been estimated that diverted cropland has an 
average productivity per acre between 85 to 90 percent of that cropland 
actually used for the production of wheat and grain sorghum. 2 
One alternative is to terminate Government supply control programs 
and allow resource adjustments to take place under free market condi-
tions. One set of estimates are that without Government programs, 
prices received by farmers in the short run would be ten to 20 percent 
lower, gross receipts would be five to 15 percent less and net farm 
3 income would fall by 25 to 50 percent. One set of specific estimates 
for wheat indicate a long term free market price of $1.22 per bushel, 
compared with a 1961-65 average price of $1.67. Grain sorghum would 
fall to $0.84 per bushel from $1.00. Net farm income would stabilize 
at a level of 11.3 billion dollars from a 1961-65 average of 13.2 
billion dollars. 4 
The other alternative of continuing Government control programs 
(primarily land diversion) also implies a continuing high Treasury cost. 
Pressures to reduce, or at least not raise, the cost of farm programs 
are great. Mandatory control programs minimize Government costs and 
can maintain farm income. In general, farmers have, however, objected 
to mandatory control programs because of restrictions on production 
and marketing decisions. Consequently, production control in agricul-
ture are now for the most part obtained by voluntary programs. 
The number of possible voluntary programs is large, and they are 
not equally efficient in use of public funds to reduce production and 
raise farm income. An important question is "What voluntary control 
programs are most efficient in use of Government funds?" 
An index of cost effectiveness or theoretical efficiency of pro-
grams is 
1 E=---C 
PY 1 
1 < E < 00 
C < PY 
where E.is the value of production remove.cl per program :00.llar spent, 
C is variable e.o.sts per acre, P is product price, and Y .is .. yield. 5 
It is apparent· .that ·as variable costs approach the gross; .v.a.l.ue of pro-
duction, efficiency becomes large and approaches .infinity..· E becomes 
larger (.the . ratio.:· .G/PY becomes larger and approaches. one) as .land be-
3 
comes more margina'l·in quality (lower Y), as product prices fall (lower 
P) and as variable costs become larger (higher .C).. On the·:be·st land, 
costs become small relative to returns, hence C/PY approaches zero and 
E approaches one. 
A greater proportion of costs become variable costs when the time 
period is extended .and .. when whole .farms are retired,. so that labor and 
machinery assets become·variable costs. Thus, the theoretical effici-
ency of voluntary land retirement programs is highest with long-term, 
whole-farm programs that are concentrated on land of marginal quality. 
Objectives 
A need exists to determine the actual, as well as .the. theoretic, 
efficiency of alternate' pro due tion ·:withdrawal programs. Specifically, 
this study· has the fo·llowing major objectives: 
.1. To determine· the theoretical efficiency of part and whole farm 
participation, with and· .wi·thout grazing, in various voluntary 
land withdrawal programs which include: 
4 
(a) Short-run acreage diversion orientated to wheat and feed 
grains. 
(b) Long-term land retirement of ten-yearduration. 
(c) Land purchases by Government. 
(d) Nonrecourse loans to remove land from production and for 
an unspecified period of years. 
2. To estimate the efficiency of the above programs on the basis 
of the payment which farmers state they would require to 
participate. 
3. To analyze some of the factors that determine participation in 
Government .programs and. the reasons for the difference between 
theoretical and actual par.ticipation. 
Results of this s.tudy. are intende.d to provide policymakers with 
guidelines useful in co.nstructing a cost-effective supply control pro-
gram for agriculture. The various prog.rams will be ranked according to 
their computed or theoretical efficiency and ranked again according to 
the efficiency calculated from the resp.onses given by the farmers 
interviewed. Results given by the two types of analyses will be com-
pared and contrasted in an effort to determine better a priori methods 
of program evaluation. Knowledge of how farmers think and act in 
regard to farm programs should help those woo design programs in select-
ing those provisions which are most acceptable to farmers. 
Previous Studies 
Previous studies on the subject of farm programs can be divided 
into two types. One type begins. with the assumption that a farmer will 
retire a given category of cropland whenever the payment offered is 
5 
greater than his expected return over variable costs. The procedure is 
then to divide the cropland areas of the United States into numerous 
homogeneous units and to develop crop budgets for each unit. The crop-
land within each unit is then arrayed on a scale from the lowest return 
over variable costs to the highest profit acreage. It is then a simple 
matter to calculate the number of acres that theoretically would be 
retired for a given payment or to calculate the amount of money that 
would be required to retire a specified acreage. This first type of 
study is similar to the first objective of this study which provides 
for calculation of the theoretical efficiency of various programs. 
In one such theoretical study, three programs were compared. A 
retirement program including only whole farms with grazing of retired 
land prohibited gave the best theoretic average efficiency a $2.85 
reduction in crop production per dollar of program cost. When partial 
farm diversion and grazing was permitted, the theoretical efficiency 
fell to $2.04 per dollar of cost. If grazing was not allowed on the 
partial farm diversion program the efficiency ratio was $1. 80 per 
dollar. 6 
The second type of research study has focused on what farmers have 
done under actual program situations. Since the variety of programs 
offered in the past has been quite large, these studies offer a valu-
able "check" on the theoretical studies. The second objective of this 
study lies between the theoretical and the actual in that it relates to 
what farmers say they would do when faced with a hypothetical program 
choice. 
Short-term or yearly diversion programs are considered theoreti-
cally to have the lowest efficiency. A study of the Acreage Reserve 
6 
Program during the period 1956-58 showed a return of $1.70 in crop out-
. 7 put reduction for each dollar payment. The 1961 Feed Grain Program 
also involved yearly diversion. In a study of participants in the 
North Central Plains, it was found that corn production was reduced by 
8 $1.14 for each dollar of program payment. 
In a study by Christensen and Aines of longer term land retire-
ment programs, with a theoretically higher efficiency, the Conservation 
Reserve between 1957 and 1960 diverted $2.92 in crop production per 
dollar of payment. The long-term Cropland Conversion Program in the 
period 1964-65 had an average output reduction by counties ranging 
from $0.67 to $3.87 per dollar of cost. 9 
Several studies have attacked the question of why some farmers 
participate in programs when others do not. This question relates to 
the third objective of this study concerning the gap between the 
theoretically indicated program response and what farmers say they 
would do. 
When participants and nonparticipants in the.Feed Grain Program in 
Minnesota were statistically compared, it was found that participants 
had more cropland and fewer livestock per acre than did nonpartici-
10 pants. There was no significant difference between participants and 
nonparticipants in factors such as age, off...,farm.employment or expected 
prices. A study of the 1961 Feed Grain Pro.gram .and the Conservation 
Reserve Program in the North Central Plains also found that larger 
farms were more likely than small farms· to.participate in programs. 
The same study could find no correlation- between farmers' attitudes 
toward government farm policy or programs and their.participation in 
11 the same. Another study of the 1962 Feed Grain Program in the Corn 
7 
Belt found the significant factors associated with participants to be a 
crop-share rent-t.enure situation, a high ratio of crop sales to live-
stock sales and large farm size measured in cropland or crop bases. 
12 There were no differences in crop yields. 
When farmers were asked directly why they participated in control 
' programs, in addition to the profit associated with the paytll.ent, they 
gave such reasons as: (a) to improve the land, (b) to help reduce 
surpluses, (c) to reduce risk, and (d) to reduce costs. 13 Reasons 
given by farmers to App and Sundquist for not participating in programs, 
other than an unprofitable payment level, included the need for feed 
for livestock and inequities in program payment rates among farmers. 
Outline of Following Chapters 
The order of presentation for the remainder of this dissertation 
is as follows: 
Chapter II - describes the sampling procedure, interview technique 
and methods of data analysis. 
Chapter III - presents the calculation of the theoretical effici-
ency of the alternative program. 
Chapter IV - estimates the efficiency of the various programs on 
the basis of farmers' actual response. 
Chapter V - analyzes the gap between the theoretical and actual 
efficiency estimates. 
Chapter VI - summarizes the results of the study and presents the 
conclusion and their implications. 
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CHAPTER II 
SURVEY PROCEDURE 
Oklahoma has been divided into subregions for the purpose of ana-
lyzing crop resource requirements, costs and returns. These subregions 
are unique multicounty areas, delineated in such a manner that the area 
within each is fairly homogeneous with respect to soils, climate and 
cropping practices. There are alternative crop budgets prepared periodi-
cally for each subregion and published as a processed series bulletin 
of the Oklahoma Agricultural Experiment Station. 
Four of these subregions, making up the western half of the state, 
were chosen as sample areas for this study. Figure 1 shows the boun-
daries of each subregion used -- the Panhandle, northwest Oklahoma, 
northcentral Oklahoma, and southwest Oklahoma. These four regions 
alone account for over 90 percent of the wheat production and over 75 
percent of the grain sorghum production in Oklahoma. 1 
Sampling Procedure 
One county was randomly selected from each of the four subregions 
described above. The sample contained a diversity of rainfall, soil 
types, competing farm enterprises, tenure arrangements, and availability 
of off-farm work such as is found in other commercial wheat and feed 
grain production areas of the state. Figure 1 shows the four sample 
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Figure 1. The Four Production Subregions and Four Counties from Which the 
Sample was Drawn 
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counties. in which farmers were interviewed_....,...., Texas, Harper, .Grant, and 
Tillman. 
Budgetary limitations restricted the number of personal interviews 
to approximately 200 dryland farm operators. The 200 .potential inter-
views were divided among the four counties on the basis .of the .number 
of nonirrigated farms with harvested cropland .as given by the 1964 
Census of Agriculture. 
The sample was stratified between present program .participants 
and nonparticipants within each county by the percentage .of the county's 
eligible farmers that participated in the 1967 Feed Grain .Program. The 
present program participation varied from a low of 6T percent in the 
Texas County population to a high of 76 percent in the Tillman County 
population. Table I shows how the intended total .county .samples were 
divided between program participants and nonparticipants • 
. . TABLE I 
SAMPLE DISTRIBUTION AMONG COUNTIES AND PARTICIPATION CATEGORIES 
Intended .SamEle Usahle .Schedules 
Non- Non-
County Participants. participants Participants - . participants 
Grant 58 20 39 34 
Harper 21 8 23 10 
Texas 29 14 39 6 
Tillman 38 12 42 5 
Total 146 54 143 55 
12 
After the number of program participants and nonparticipants re-
quired for each county sample was determined, the names of farm owner-
operators or farm operators were randomly drawn from the appropriate 
lists in each county ASCS office~ To allow for interviewee refusals, 
those who had died or moved and other contingencies, a replacement list 
was drawn in each county equal in size to 25 percent of the original 
sample. Table I shows the number of usable dryland questionnaires that 
were completed in each. 
Questionnaire Design and Data Gathering 
The collection of sufficient information to allow the analyses out-
lined in the objectives resulted in a lengthy and difficult question-
naire. In addition, it was necessary to resolve the differences in the 
way data were organized in the county ASCS records and in the farmers' 
minds. The result was a 13 page questionnaire in two parts, with 
separate columns in the appropriate places for each individual ASCS 
farm under the control of the respondent. 
To take the entire questionnaire by personal interview would have 
involved a visit of more than two hours per farmer. There were also 
some questions that the farmer might need time to consider before 
answering. For these reasons, the first four pages of the question-, 
naire were mailed to the operator along with a cover letter explaining 
the purpose of the study (see letter in Appendix A). The respondent 
was asked to fill out Part I on his own. Part I of the questionnaire 
is reproduced in Appendix A. 
Shortly after the respondent received the first part of the ques-
tionnaire, the interviewer called and arranged an appointment to 
13 
complete Part II. At the time of the visit, Part I was checked for com-
pleteness and accuracy. Before the interview took -place, -all information 
required on -the first page of Part II was obtained from the county ASCS 
files. This insured that the interviewer had the identifications and 
sizes of all farms, allotments and bases under the control of the 
operator before the interview took place. Part II of the questionnaire 
is displayed in Appendix A. 
The interviews took place first in Grant and Harper counties 
beginning the fall of 1967, and concluded in Texas and Tillman counties 
in the early summer of 1968. A total of four interviewers were used, 
but over 75 percent of the total usable schedulates were completed by 
the author and one other interviewer. 
Refusals and Biases 
Schedules were completed on 79 percent of -the names drawn in the 
sample. Percentages of completion for counties were: Grant, 75; 
Tillman, 75; Texas, 83; Harper, 92. The lower percentage of completion 
in Grant County was partly due to a considerable time lag that unavoid-
ably developed between the mailing of the first part of the -question-
naire and the time the interview was scheduled. Grant -Was also the 
first county surveyed, and the interviewers were still inexperienced. 
In Tillman County, the time of the interviewing, early summer, was a 
busy season for farmers. 
A little over half of the noncompletions in each county were out-
right refusals by the farmer to cooperate. The remainder was due to 
sickness, death, quit farming, moved from county or other reasons. 
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It is difficult to estimate the characteristics and preferences of 
farmers who could not be interviewed. The results of the study may be 
biased slightly toward farmers who prefer Government programs. The 
small number of refusals was unlikely to affect significantly the con-
' clusions of the study. 
Profile of Sample 
Table II presents data which describe the farms and .farmers in 
each county. These data were summarized from information obtained from 
farmers interviewed. 
TABLE II 
DATA DESCRIPTIVE OF FARMS AND FARMERS IN SURVEY 
Item Grant Harper Texas . Tillman 
Farmers interviewed 73 33 45 47 
Average age 49.4 51. 5 51. 8 51.5 
Average years of school 12.0 10.5 11.4 11.4 
Average acres cropland 399 653 650 420 
Average acres wheat allotment 279 430 390 221 
Average acres feed grain base 29 87 110 28 
Farm full time (percent) 79.5 84.8 75.0 72,4 
Percent Farm Bureau member 45.2 57.6 33.3 25.9 
Percent Farmers Union member 11. 0 9.1 6.7 34.0 
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In subsequent chapters, various programs .to control production 
will be compared at various levels of land diversion .or value of pro-
duction removed. For this reason Table III sets forth the land use 
pattem of the sample of 421 farm units as well as the allotments, 
bases and projected yields. The data in the first column are for the 
total sample. The second column gives average data per ASCS farm unit. 
TABLE III 
CROP AND LAND DATA FOR FARMS IN SURVEY 
Total of Average 
Item All Farms Per Farm 
Number of ASCS farms 421 1 
Number of managerial units 197 
Use of land in 1967, acres 
Sorghum grain 4,627 11.0 
Sorghum forage 2,645 6.3 
Wheat 57,322 136.2 
Barley 2,290 5.4 
Hay and pasture 7,192 17.1 
Cotton 2,090 5.0 
Fallow 22,523 53.5 
Total cropland 98,689 234.4 
Allotments and bases in 1967' acres 
Feed grain 11,300 26.8 
Wheat 61,620 146.4 
Barley, oats, rye 6,366 15.1 
Cotton 3,017 7.2 
Projected yields in 1967 
Sorghum, bu. 32.1 
Wheat, bu. 22.5 
Cotton, lbs. 274 
Total value production, dollars 
Wheat at $2.00 per bu. 3,520,523 . 8,362 
Wheat at $1.25 per bu. 2,550,854 6,059 
.FOOTNOTES 
1 Oklahoma State Board of Agricultu.r.e., .. Annua:l: .Rep:o.r.t· .for 1966 
(Oklahoma City, 1966), pp. S32-S39. 
CHAPTER III 
THEORETICAL EFFICIENCY 
The key assumption in the calculation of theoretical efficiencies 
for various program alternatives is that the farmer will respond the 
way he "should". That is to say he will take part in a program when-
ever the payment received equals or exceeds the profit foregone. Behind 
this assumption lie the supporting assumptions of perfect knowledge, 
rationality, profit maximization, and flexibility. Without an objective 
method of specifying these assumptions, it is necessary to proceed as 
if each unit of land, allotment or base will be retired or diverted 
whenever the program payment is as large as the return over variable 
costs from using the unit in the usual manner. 
The concept described in the preceding paragraph is .embodied in 
an index of the value of production removed per program dollar spent: 
1 E =---C 1 PY 
where E is an .efficiency index between one and infinity, C is the sum 
1 
of variable costs per acre, P is product price and Y is yield. 
Variable Cos ts 
The cost element of the index is subject to variation from a num-
ber of sources. As the time period of the program increases, the 
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farmer is able to sell or not replace some productive assets, such as 
owned machinery and regularly hired labor, thus converting these 
expenses from fixed to variable. By the same process whole farm retire-
ment increases the proportion of variable costs while reducing fixed 
costs, when compared with programs that retire only part of a farm's 
crop acreage. The agronomic quality of the land itself can affect the 
variable cost of production and particularly the ratio of costs to 
returns. Thus on land of marginal quality the C/PY ratio becomes 
larger. 
For each program analyzed theoretically, it is necessary to care-
fully define the items included as variable costs. For all programs 
the following costs are considered to be variable: chemicals, ferti-
lizer, seed, hired machinery, and machinery operating expenses (repairs 
and fuel). As the time span of the program is extended from one year to 
tenyears, machinery ownership costs (depreciation and interest) are 
included as variable. For analysis of cropland easements, all labor 
costs are added to the variable component. In the case of the crop-
land purchase program it is logical to add landownership costs (taxes 
and interest) to variable costs. In practice this gives a total vari-
able cost that nearly equals the value of crop production when wheat 
is priced at $2.00 per bushel, and which exceeds crop receipts with 
wheat at $1. 25. For this reason the efficiency index given above is 
not used for the theoretical analysis of land purchase by the 
Government. In this case the land is priced at the prevailing level 
for its type and location. An annual cost of Government ownership, 
based on this price, is then calculated using a six and one half per-
cent interest rate. 
The cost data are derived from two sources. Each farmer inter-
viewed estimated the yearly variable costs of producing wheat, grain 
sorghum, and pas tu re for his farm. Machinery ownership .cos ts, labor 
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costs, and costs for crops other than wheat, grain sorghum, and pasture 
were obtained from budgets prepared by the Oklahoma Experiment Station 
and the USDA for the areas sampled. Land ownership costs (taxes and 
interest) were calculated at seven and one half percent of the pre-
2 
vailing market value for the land. 
Yields 
Yields also are an important variable in the efficiency index. 
They vary between farms as the quality of the soil, climate, and man-
agerial ability vary. They also vary within a farm due to soil differ-
ences. The soil on each farm sampled was classified into .from one to 
three quality categories. The farmer placed a normal yield for wheat, 
grain sorghum, and pasture on each category. The yields of other crops 
were obtained from the same publications used for the cost data. For 
analytical purposes it was assumed that high value crops, such as cotton, 
wheat, and grain sorghum were grown on the better quality land. Non-
controlled crops, hay, pasture, diverted, and idle land :were assumed 
to be on the least productive land. 
Prices 
Prices were fixed at one assumed value with the :exception of 
wheat. On most questions the farmer was .instructed to .assume a wheat 
price of either $2. 00 per bushel or $1. 25 per bushel or to answer for 
both prices. Other prices were assumed to be: $8.00 per animal unit 
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month for hay and pasture, $1.12 per bushel for .grain .sorghum,. $18. 00 
per ton for sorghum forage hay, $7.00 per ton for.sorghum:forage silage, 
$0. 88 per b.ushel for barley, and 18. 4 cents per pound .for cotton. In 
all cases fallow land .is given a zero value in calculating ;the value of 
crop production. 
Program Alternatives 
The alternative programs were selected to give :a wide range of 
time periods. The diversion period ranged from .one .year :to infinity in 
the case of Government land purchase. The programs also .ranged from 
part farm situations, such as wheat allotments only, feed grain bases 
only or poorest land .only, through to whole farm .retirement. The ten-
year, part-farm retirement program was studied with :and without grazing. 
All other programs exclude the grazing privilege. 
For each program .alternative the following .analytical .procedure 
was used. The theoretical efficiency, value of the :production removed 
per dollar of program cost, was calculated for each .eligible farm in 
each program. Next farms were ranked from high to .low :on the basis of 
this theoretical efficiency within each of the study .counties. Farms 
were added to the ranked but· until 30 percent of the total cropland 
acreage for each .county sample was reached. The .30 .percent of the 
farms which could be retired mos.t efficiently in each .county were then 
merged into a master list for the entire study area which .also was 
ranked on a high to low efficiency basis. Farms were then taken in 
order from this master list and accumulated into land retirement 
levels of three percent increments. 
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This procedure implies that price discrimination .was practiced, in 
that each farm was paid only the amount theoretically required to gain 
its participation in each program. The procedure also results in farms 
with the highest ratio of cost of production to value of production 
being retired by the program. Thus application of the cost-effectiveness 
principle of removing the most production per dollar of program cost 
is also consistent with economic efficiency (retiring marginal land) if 
farm income is to be supported by land retirement. 
Government Purchase of All Cropland 
The total cost of USDA programs to stabilize farm prices and 
income from 1933 to 1968 has been over $40 billion. For less than half 
this expenditure the Government could have purchased 80 million acres 
at $225 per acre and leased it back for grazing or recreation. Would 
a land purchase program actually give a greater reduction of output per 
dollar of program cost than nonpurchase type programs? To answer this 
question the study included an option to purchase whole farms and an 
alternate option of purchasing only the poorest land on each farm. 
1 As mentioned previously the assumed efficiency index, E = ---C-
l PY 
could not be used in the evaluation of this program. When land owner-
ship costs were included in the C/PY ratio, costs exceeded returns on 
28 percent of the farms. An alternative procedure was devised. The 
purchase price for all cropland on each farm was set at the prevailing 
market price for farms of similar quality and location. This cost was 
determined early in the questionnaire and is different .from the farmers' 
asking price for actually selling his cropland to the Government, as 
used in the next chapter. It was then assumed that the Government 
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would experience an annual cost of six and one half percent of purchase 
cost for interest on investment. 
In computing the efficiency ratio for the purchase of cropland, the 
value of crop production was determined using alternative wheat prices 
of $2.00 and $1.25 per bushel. With $2.00 wheat, 35 out of 421 farms 
had net returns to land less than six and one-half percent of the pur-
chase price. Thus it would not be "profitable" for the Government to 
purchase these 8,204 acres. At $1.25 wheat, 44 farms comprising 10,841 
acres were "unprofitable". Theoretically these farms were also unpro-
fitable to the present owners in their present use. 
Table IV depicts the effect of removing increasing acreages through 
Government purchase of all cropland on sample farms. Efficiencies are 
quite high, particularly at lower retirement levels. The size and value 
of production for farms included in the three percent level are consi-
derably less than the sample averages. Above the three percent level 
farms tend to be slightly smaller than the sample average in acreage, 
but slightly larger than average in value of production. 
Appendix B contains supplemental data for each program type by 
retirement level. These appendix data consist largely of crop acreages 
showing specific land use, as well as allotments, bases, and projected 
yields. The effect of the 30 percent limitations on land retired per 
county can be readily seen in the cotton acreage column of Table XXXI. 
Cotton acreage increases rapidly from the three percent to the 12 per-
cent levels and then stabilizes when the limit for Tillman County 
the only county in the sample -- is reached. The projected yield data 
do not indicate any trend in sorghum or cotton yields from the lowest to 
the highest retirement levels. There is however a distinct tendency 
Percent 
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TABLE IV 
THEORETICAL RANKING OF GOVERNMENT PURCHASE OF ALL CROPLAND 
BY THREE PERCENT LAND INCREMENTS 
Number Percent Annual 
Total of Value of of All Gross Land Ownership 
Acres Farms Production Production Cost Cost 
Wheat $2.00 
3,042 18 $ 124,076 3.5 $ 335,458 $ 21,805 
6,032 28 255,631 7.3 750,685 48,795 
8,901 40 391,939 11.1 1,236,415 80,367 
12,006 59 541,717 15.4 1,807,679 ll7,499 
14,780 73 696,110 19.8 2,429,232 157' 900 
17,649 84 842,045 23.9 3,061,832 199,019 
21,308 94 1,010,400 28.7 3,850,143 250,259 
23,717 108 1,122,738 31.9 4,399,899 285,993 
Wheat $1.25 
2,706 17 91,170 3.6 334,740 21,758 
5,888 32 185, 771 7.3 761,637 49,506 
8,834 42 280,428 11.0 1,216,398 79,066 
ll,896 61 394,099 15.4 1,815,502 ll8,008 
14,766 76 499,964 19.6 2,426,761 157,739 
18,223 90 614,854 24.1 3,156,691 205,185 
20,782 98 690, 711 27.1 3,677,751 239,054 
23,684 111 789,180 30.9 4,380,008 284,701 
Production 
Retired Per 
Dollar of 
Cost 
$5.69 
5.24 
4.88 
4.61 
4.41 
4.23 
4.04 
3.93 
4.19 
3.75 
3.55 
3.34 
3.17 
3.00 
2.89 
2. 77 
"" w 
for farms in the lowest retirement levels to have lower wheat yields. 
At all retirement levels studied the percentage of land retired was 
less than the percentage of production retired. This indicates that 
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the analytical techniques for maximizing program efficiency has resulted 
in the selection of farms of higher than average production per acre. 
Stated in another manner it appears the "good" farms are underpriced 
relative to "poor" farms. 
There are some differences between farms drawn into the program 
when wheat is supported at $1.25 per bushel rather than $2.00. At the 
lower wheat support price the farms on which the program could be more 
efficient tended to be smaller in total cropland acreage, but higher in 
the acreage of grain sorghum and forage sorghum. Farms with a high 
percentage of land in wheat experienced a considerable lowering in total 
value of production when wheat was supported at $1.25. This caused 
predominantly wheat farms to have a much lower efficiency value of pro-
duction removed per dollar of program cost. 
Government Purchase of Poorest Cropland 
Contrasted with a proposal that the Government offer to purchase 
the entire cropland unit of selected farms, an alternative was proposed 
wherein only the poorest segment of cropland on selected farms be 
purchased. 
The purchase price for the poorest cropland category may not be as 
reliable as the whole farm data. The appraisals given by farmers were 
for "similar farms in your community" and were not broken down on a 
part-farm basis. The purchase price of the poor land segment of each 
farm was estimated by capitalizing the net return from this land, using 
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the same capitalization ratio that prevailed for all cropland. These 
price estimates for poor land, while seeming to be theoretically fair, 
were lower in comparison to the whole farm price than the ratio of poor 
land prices to whole farm prices given by farmers as their actual 
selling price. 
Only 279 of the 421 farms sampled designated some land as poor. 
For these 279 farms the poorest land category averaged 59 acres, with a 
value of production of $873 when wheat was $2.00 and $714 when wheat 
was $1.25. Since on the average half of the poorest land was fallow 
acres, many farms had little or no production in this category. With 
wheat at $2.00, 7,532 acres on 150 farms did not have sufficient value 
of production to equal the annual cost of purchasing the poorest acre-
age. At $1. 25 wheat the number of "unprofitable" poor land segments 
climbed to 175 and the acreage to 9,012. Because of this the purchase 
of poorest cropland, where advantageous to the Government, would only 
remove a maximum of between six and nine percent of the total cropland. 
Tables V and XXXII give aggregate data for all farms which could 
enter the program on at least a dollar of production per dollar of 
annual ownership cost basis. At both prices for wheat, the first farms 
to enter the program -- at the three percent retirement level -- had a 
larger than average segment of poor land and had a higher proportion 
of their poor land in crop production. For example, the average sample 
farm had $873 in production from poor land with wheat at $2.00. The 37 
farms in the three percent retirement level averaged $1,945 in crop 
production. In contrast with the program to purchase all cropland, the 
percentage of production removed with poor land retirement lagged 
behind the percentage of cropland retired at all levels. In general, 
Percent 
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TABLE V 
THEORETICAL RANKING OF GOVERNMENT PURCHASE OF POOREST CROPLAND 
BY THREE PERCENT LAND INCREMENTS 
Number Percent Annual 
Total of Value of of All Gross Land Ownership 
Acres Farms Production Production Cost Cost 
Wheat $2.00 
2,953 35 $ 88,900 2.5 $ 460,097 $ 29,906 
5,901 78 158,453 4.5 1,018,725 66,217 
8,875 129 225,025 6.4 1,749,048 113,688 
Wheat $1.25 
2,960 37 71,983 2.8 473,649 30,787 
5,893 84 130,761 5.1 l,116,C03 72,540 
Production 
Retired Per 
Dollar of 
Cost 
$2.97 
2.39 
1.98 
2.34 
1.80 
N 
°' 
the theoretical efficiencies computed for this program are about one-
half those featuring the purchase of all cropland. 
Cropping Easement on All Cropland 
27 
In an attempt to overcome widespread objection to ~Government pur-
chase and ownership of cropland, a cropping easement .program was pre-
sented. In this alternative the participant would receive a non-
interest, non-recourse loan from the Government in exchange for the 
permanent cropping rights on his land. As long as the participant 
enjoyed the interest free use of the loan he could not crop the land in 
any way. He could repay the loan at any time and restore the cropping 
status of the land. In effect the participant 1s annual payment was 
the opportunity cost of the loan to him. The Government's annual cost 
was the cost of providing the loan (assumed for purposes of analysis) 
to be six and one half percent per annum. As no time limit was speci-
fied, the loan and program could continue in perpetuity at the discre-
tion of the participant. 
The theoretical efficiencies were computed using the standard 
formula described at the beginning of the chapter. All costs were 
considered variable except land ownership cos ts. There were 13 farms 
comprising 1,956 acres where variable costs exceeded value of production 
when wheat was priced at $2.00 per bushel. The number of unprofitable 
farms was 14 and the acreage 2,125 when wheat was priced at $1.25 .. 
By the nature of the efficiency formula a negative theoretical 
efficiency is computed whenever costs exceed value of production. 
Since there are no retums over variable costs in these cases, it is 
impossible to compute a payment rate which might induce program 
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participation. If unprofitable farms were included as participants the 
production on these farms would be included in the value of production 
retired, but no appropriate program payment would be added to program 
costs. While their inclusion would increase program efficiencies mod-
estly, there is no reason to believe that these farms would actually 
participate in a voluntary program. Therefore the procedu're in this 
study has been to exclude from program participation these farms where 
variable costs exceed value of production. 
Tables VI and XXXIII contain descriptive data of participants at 
each level of retirement. The assumption of a price of $1.25 for wheat 
automatically results in higher average efficiencies than the $2.00 
program, because efficiencies become larger as the gap between expenses 
and value of production narrows. 
The efficiency ratios hold up quite well over the entire range o:f 
retirement levels. Throughout, the percentage of production retired 
lags the percentage of cropland retired. 
At the three percent level the farms participating at both prices 
averaged smaller in total acres and value of production than is true at 
the six percent level. At both levels the participating farms were 
considerably above the sample average in total acreage and fallow 
acreage and considerably below the sample average in value of production. 
With wheat at $2.00, participants at lower retirement levels had 
wheat allotments that averaged about 30 percent of the total farm size. 
At lowest retirement level, with wheat at $1.25, wheat allotments aver-
aged 55 percent of the total farm S·ize compared with a sample average 
of 62 percent. There was little difference in feed grain bases when 
wheat prices varied, but the $2.00 wheat program drew almost all of the 
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available cotton farms from Tillman County into the program by the time 
nine percent of the land had been retired. 
TABLE VI 
THEORETICAL RANKING OF CROPPING EASEMENT ON ALL CROPLAND 
BY THREE PERCENT LAND INCREMENTS 
Production 
Percent Number Percent Variable Retired Per 
of All Total of Value of of all Production Dollar of 
Cropland Acres Farms Production Production Costs Payment 
Wheat $2.00 
3 2,736 ll $ 83,286 2.4 $ 59,751 $3.54 
6 6,373 23 191,330 5.4 128,456 3.04 
9 8,802 34 281,404 8.0 180,800 2.80 
12 11,940 47 362,844 10.3 224,690 2.63 
15 14,886 60 467,535 13.3 276,467 2.45 
18 17,627 73 559,192 15.9 320,173 2.34 
21 20,799 88 646,803 18.4 360,613 2.26 
24 23,6 77 102 732,579 20.8 398,564 2.19 
Wheat $1. 25 
3 3,026 12 50,417 2.0 45,722 10.74 
6 6,077 20 ll3,056 4.4 97,418 7.23 
9 8,992 33 199,427 7.8 164,427 5.70 
12 11, 783 48 268,707 10.5 216,077 5.10 
15 14,788 66 338,945 13.3 265,827 4.64 
18 17,821 81 417,346 16.4 317,832 4.19 
21 20,786 94 486,701 19.1 362,224 3.91 
24 23, 718 111 570,691 22.4 414,425 3.65 
There was a noticeable decline in wheat yields at higher retire-
ment levels in the $2.00 wheat program. This was accompanied by an 
increase in average wheat acreage per farm from 45 acres at three 
percent to 114 at 24 percent. This change in wheat yields or wheat 
30 
acreage per farm did not occur in the $1.25 wheat program. 
The cause of this phenomena lies in the geographical patterns of 
retirement caused by the two different wheat prices. When wheat is 
$2.00, predominately wheat farms are more profitable relative to farms 
with substantial acreages of competing crops. At this price, eight of 
the 11 farms retired at the three percent level were from Tillman 
County in the cotton area. Dropping the wheat price to $1.25 affects 
the specialized wheat farm most. At this price only four of the first 
12 farms retired are from the cotton area. 
Cropping Easement on Poorest Cropland 
The theoretical efficiency of a loan to obtain cropping rights was 
computed on the poorest cropland category only for those farms desig-
nating such a category of land. Using the criterion of retiring farms 
that had a value of production higher than their variable production 
costs, it was possible to obtain only 12 percent of the land when wheat 
was valued at $2.00 and nine percent at $1.25 •.. As mentioned earlier 
there were 93 farms with 3,990 acres in this category that produced 
nothing. In addition there were 22 farms with 607 poorest acres that 
were computed to be "unprofitable". 
Tables VII and XXXIVtontain data for this program alternative. 
Except for the three percent level of the $2.00 program, efficiencies 
are less for poor land retirement than for the whole farm easement pro-
gram. Production removed at each retirement level lags behind the per-
centage of cropland removed. There appears to be little difference 
between the $2.00 program and the $1.25 program in size of farm or the 
land use pattern. 
TABLE VII 
THEORETICAL RANKING OF CROPPING EASEMENT ON POOREST CROPLAND 
BY THREE PERCENT LAND INCREMENTS 
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Production 
Percent Number Percent Variqble Retired Per 
of All Total of Value of of All Production Dollar of 
Cropland Acres Farms Production Production Costs Payment 
Wheat $2.00 
3 2,965 64 $ 70,918 2.. 0 $ 53,925 $4.17 
6 5,926 94 135,187 3.8 87,998 2.86 
9 8,906 126 197,280 5.6 ll4,416 2.38 
12 ll,850 166 245,243 7.0 128,259 2.10 
Wheat $1.25 
3 3,054 51 62,522 2.5 51,146 5.50 
6 5,908 87 ll0,949 4.3 83,263 4.01 
9 8,869 116 153,959 6.0 106,650 3.25 
Ten-Year Retirement of All Cropland 
Another program alternative considered was the familiar long term 
land retirement. In this case the farmer would retire his entire crop-
land base for ten years and receive an annual payment. The land could 
not be grazed. At a wheat price of $2.00 there were tenfarms (1,522 
acres) that did not cover variable costs. There were 11 such farms 
(1,691 acres) at $1.25. 
These farms are not included in the program since their computed 
theoretical efficiency would be negative. Tables VIII and XXXV summa-
rize the data for this program alternative. The $2.00 wheat price 
results in farms with a large proportion of cropland in hay, pasture, 
cotton, and fallow in the lower retirement levels. On the other hand, 
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the $1.25 price for wheat results in farms of predominate wheat acreage 
entering at lower diversion levels. In fact, the $1.25 wheat program 
results in about half as much sorghum being retired as the $2.00 program. 
Percent 
of All 
TABLE VIII 
THEORETICAL RANKING OF TEN-YEAR RETIREMENT OF ALL CROPLAND 
BY THREE PERCENT LAND INCREMENTS 
Production 
Number Percent Variable Retired Per 
Total of Value of of All Production Dollar of 
Cropland Acres Farms Production Production Costs Payment 
Wheat $2.00 
3 3,008 13 $ 80,330 2.3 $ 54,609 $3.12 
6 6,061 27 190,847 5.4 119,223 2.66 
9 8,664 35 276,827 7.9 165,687 2.49 
12 11,642 45 350,242 9.9 202,030 2.36 
15 14,889 60 450,408 12.8 247,705 2.22 
18 17' 710 72 550,977 15.6 291,522 2.12 
21 20,737 86 638,558 18.1 328,003 2.06 
24 23,761 102 730,529 20.8 364,902 2.00 
Wheat $1. 25 
3 3,030 12 47,425 1.9 39,678 6.12 
6 5,698 20 102, 371 4.0 82,184 5.07 
9 8,824 35 190,730 7.5 145,852 3.91 
12 11,865 48 267,788 10.5 198,662 3.87 
15 14,836 67 339,763 13.3 245,032 3.59 
18 17,694 82 416,231 16.3 291,245 3.33 
21 20,700 95 498,963 19.6 339,220 3.12 
24 23,672 110 566,632 22.2 376,942 2.99 
For both programs there is a peculiar change in size of farm and 
value of production per farm that takes place as the retirement level 
increases. At the first level farms are smaller than average in 
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acreage and production. At between nine and 12 percent of land retired 
they reach a peak in both measures. Beyond 12 percent the acreage per 
farm and production per farm decline. 
Ten-Year Retirement of Poorest Cropland 
In addition to those 93 farms which produced nothing on the poorest 
cropland category, there were eight farms with 88 acres of poor cropland 
that did not produce enough to cover variable production costs when 
wheat was priced at $2.00. This number rose to 21 farms and 412 acres 
at a wheat price of $1.25. 
Tables IX and XXXVI summarize data for land that theoretically 
could be included in this program. The maximum acreage that could be 
obtained was 12 percent regardless of the wheat price assumed. The 
percentage of production removed at each retirement level was slightly 
over one-half of the percentage of land removed. 
As increasing percentages of land are retired under this program 
the acreage per farm, value of production p.er farm, and wheat acreage 
per farm tend to increase. This tendency is more pronounced with wheat 
at $2.00. 
Ten-Year Retirement of Poorest Cropland 
With Grazing Permitted 
In all other programs alternatives presented in this analysis, 
grazing of diverted land was assumed to be prohibited. To measure the 
effect of this one factor, an alternative was also considered of allow-
ing grazing on the poorest cropland diverted for ten years. 
TABLE IX 
THEORETICAL RANKING OF TEN-YEARRETIREMENT OF POOREST CROPLAND 
BY THREE PERCENT LAND INCREMENTS 
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Production 
Percent Number Percent Variable Retired Per 
of All Total of Value of of All Production Dollar of 
Cropland Acres Farms Production Production Costs Payment 
Wheat ~2.00 
3 2,979 65 $ 60,559 1. 7 $ 45,088 $3.91 
6 5,878 102 129,350 3.7 79,524 2.60 
9 8,906 133 193,492 5.5 104,796 2.18 
12 ll, 9ll 171 244,915 7.0 ll8,580 1.94 
Wheat $1.25 
3 2,985 58 60,358 2.4 47,555 4. 71 
6 5,905 93 111,814 4.4 78, 971 3.40 
9 8,857 124 152,125 6.0 99,555 2.89 
12 ll,808 163 192,203 7.5 113,936 1.69 
When viewed as a production control program this alternative was 
considerably less effective, from a theoretical standpoint, than any 
other alternative. Besides the 93 farms that were already producing 
nothing on their poorest cropland, there were a large number of 
additional farms that would increase total value of production by dis-
continuing their present use of poorest cropland and converting it to 
pasture usage. This increase in output occurred on 75 farms and 4,949 
acres with wheat priced at $2.00 and 111 farms with 8,466 acres when 
wheat was valued at $1.25. Therefore, it was profitable for the Govern-
ment to retire only three percent of the land with this alternative 
with a $1.25 wheat price assumption, and only six percent with a $2.00 
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price assumption. The percentage of production removed was vastly less 
than the percentage of land removed. 
Since production and variable production costs would still exist 
for land in this program a small modification of the efficiency cal-
culated was used. Rather than using gross value of production before 
participation, the amount used in the efficiency formula was the net 
reduction in production -- production before program participation minus 
value of production as grazing. Variable costs were likewise modified --
production costs before participation minus production costs as grazing. 
Thus, the value of production and variable production cost figures in 
Table X are, in fact, the net reduction of the preparticipation values. 
Percent 
of All 
Cropland 
3 
6 
3 
TABLE X 
THEORETICAL RANKING OF TEN-YEAR RETIREMENT OF POOREST 
CROPLAND WITir GRAZING PERMITTED 
Number Percent Variable 
Total of Value of of All Production 
Acres Farms Production Production Costs 
Wheat $2.00 
3,012 40 $34,967 0.9 $26,987 
5,951 81 86,122 2.4 53,123 
Wheat $1. 25 
2,989 52 36,909 1.4 25,513 
Production 
Retired Per 
Dollar of 
Payment 
$4.38 
2.61 
3.24 
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By and large the value of production removed per dollar of payment 
for .the grazirig" permitted program was not any greater than for retire-
ment of the same land without grazing. Since so little land could 
profitably be included in this option, further comparison with other 
programs is difficult. Supplemental land use data are found in 
Appendix Table XXXVII. 
Ten-Year Retirement of Wheat Allotments 
The most specific type of control program would be one directed at 
a single crop. This particular program was directed at wheat. It re-
tired the wheat allotment, retired an acreage of cropland the size of 
the allotment and prohibited the farmer from growing wheat on the re-
maining land. 
In some cases the farmer may not be planting his entire wheat 
allotment. In this case, he would be diverting all wheat acreage 
usually planted plus an additional acreage of crop or fallow to equal 
in total the allotment acreage. In other cases the farmer may be using 
the substitution provision of present programs to exceed his wheat 
allotment by means of other crop bases. In this instance, the acreage 
of land retired is only the amount of the allotment, but crops other 
than wheat would have to be grown on the remaining former wheat acreage. 
Tables XI and XXXVIII summarize data for this program. With three 
percent or six percent of the land retired, the average size of wheat 
allotments was substantially greater than the 146-acre average for the 
sample. On the other hand, ASCS projected wheat yields varied little 
as the percentage of cropland retired was increased and were very close 
to the sample average of 22.5. In spite of the picture of homogeneity 
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given by the ASCS projected yields there was a steady increase in value 
of wheat sold per acre as more of the cropland was retired. The aver-
age value of production retired per acre at the 24 percent retirement 
level was about two-thirds higher than at the three percent level. It 
would seem that ASCS projected yields underestimate actual yields on 
some farms, esvecially on farms with above average wheat yields. 
TABLE XI 
THEORETICAL RANKING OF TEN-YEARRETIREMENT OF WHEAT ALLOTMENTS 
BY THREE PERCENT LAND INCREMENTS 
Production 
Percent Number Percent Variable Retired Per 
of All Total of Value of of All Production Dollar of 
Cropland Acres Farms Production Production Costs Payment 
Wheat $2.00 
3 2,958 13 $ 87,145 2.5 $ 48,192 $2.24 
6 5,951 35 219,530 6.2 109,858 2.00 
9 8~854 59 382,571 10.9 178,171 1.87 
12 ll,821 83 525,000 14.9 234,649 1.81 
15 14' 773 101 694,365 19.7 299,014 1. 76 
18 17,884 124 873,395 24.8 363,525 1. 71 
21 20,834 146 1,010,480 28.7 410,876 1.68 
24 23,609 160 1,152,687 32.7 458,310 1.66 
Wheat $1. 25 
3 2,929 12 56,348 2.2 47,799 6.59 
6 5,922 34 144' 716 5.7 109,465 4.10 
9 8,825 58 251,474 9.9 177,778 3.41 
12 ll, 792 82 343,803 13.5 234.256 3.14 
15 14,744 100 454,882 17.8 298,621 2.91 
18 17,855 123 571, 771 22.4 363,132 2.74 
21 20,805 145 660,642 25.9 410,483 2.64 
24 23,684 174 758, 779 29.7 460,439 2.54 
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As with all other programs, there were some farms that had insuffi-
cient value of production to cover variable costs. With wheat at either 
price ($2. 00 or $1. 25) there were 35 farms with 4, 839 acres of wheat 
allotment that were unprofitable. These farms are not included as 
participants in the program. Inclusion of this average size would 
increase program efficiency substantially, if participation was obtained 
for a nominal payment. 
Ten-Year Retiremen~ of Feed Grain Bases 
Nationally several crops fall under the heading of feed grains. 
In the study area, however, only grain sorghum and forage sorghum were 
grown. In this program proposal the entire feed grain allotment would 
be retired, including an equivalent acreage of cropland. Furthermore, 
the participant could not produce any feed grain crop on his remaining 
acreage. 
Sorghum is a secondary crop on most farms in the study area. The 
average sample farm averaged 27 acres of feed grain base with a pro-
jected yield of 32 bushels. When farms with feed grain bases that did 
not produce enough to cover variable costs were eliminated from parti-
cipation, 4,040 acres of feed grain base (about one-third of the sample 
total) were affected. 
As shown in Tables XII and XXXIX only six percent of the total 
cropland could be retired with this alternative. This ineffectiveness 
stems from the small average of feed grain loss and from the disquali-
fication from participation of acreage with returns below variable 
costs. When wheat was valued at $2.00 the maximum value of production 
removed was only three and one half percent. Farms included in both 
retirement levels averaged a much higher base per farm and a higher 
acreage of sorghuµi actually planted than the sample as a whole. At 
both retirement levels over 80 percent of the base had been planted. 
TABLE XII 
THEORETICAL RANKING OF TEN-YEARRETIREMENT OF FEED GRAIN BASES 
BY THREE PERCENT LAND INCREMENTS 
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Production 
Percent Number Percent Variable Retired Per 
of All Total of Value of of All Production Dollar of 
Cropland Acres Farms Production Production Costs Payment 
3 2,954 56 $ 45,841 1.3 $34,633 $4.09 
6 6,028 180 122,410 3.5 66,903 2.21 
One-Year Retirement of Poorest Cropland 
Because one-year retirement programs have the smallest effect on 
variable production costs, the number of farms with variable costs in 
excess of value of production would be lowest with this kind of program. 
In fact, with wheat priced at $1.25 only tenfarms with 156 acres in the 
poorest cropland category failed to cover variable costs. When wheat 
was priced at $2.00, only two farms with 26 acres were unprofitable. 
In addition there were 93 farms that produced nothing on 3,990 poorest 
acres. 
Table XIII and XL display data for retirement levels up to 12 
percent -- the maximum profitably attainable under this program. At 
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the three percent level the acreage per farm is slightly smaller than 
the sample average, but the value of production per farm is slightly 
larger. At retirement levels beyond three percent the acreage per farm 
increases moderately, but the value of production retired per farm 
increases more substantially. Other than these, there are few differ-
ences between the various retirement levels or between the $2.00 
program and the $1.25 program. 
TABLE XIII 
THEORETICAL RANKING OF ONE-YEAR RETIREMENT OF POOREST CROPLAND 
BY THREE PERCENT LAND INCREMENTS 
Production 
Percent Number Percent Variable Retired Per 
of All Total of Value of of All Production Dollar of 
Cropland Acres Farms Production Production Costs Payment 
Wheat $2.00 
3 2,943 69 $ 64,459 1.8 $ 43,004 $3.00 
6 5,933 108 133,198 3.8 71,972 2.18 
9 8,885 139 196,918 5.6 92,550 1.89 
12 11, 936 175 247,222 7.0 102,783 1. 71 
Wheat $1.25 
3 2,968 66 58,679 2.3 43,086 3.76 
6 5,917 96 112,114 4.4 71,626 2. 77 
9 8,915 136 152,051 6 • .0 88,646 2.40 
12 11,824 169 194,015 7.6 100,430 2.07 
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One-Year Retirement of Wheat Allotments 
As in the ten-yearprogram for wheat, 35 farms with 4,839 acres of 
allotment not considered for participation because the value of pro-
duction did not cover variable costs. A valid theoretical efficiency 
can only be computed when variable costs are less than the value of 
production. Tables XIV and XLI give data for those farms which were 
included up to 24 percent of all cropland in the sample. 
TABLE XIV 
THEORETICAL RANKING OF ONE-YEAR RETIREMENT OF WHEAT ALLOTMENTS 
BY THREE PERCENT LAND INCREMENTS 
Production 
Percent Number Percent Variable Retired Per 
of All Total of Value of of All Production Dollar of 
Cropland Acres Farms Production Production Costs Payment 
Wheat $2.00 
3 2,888 13 $ 84,945 2.4 $ 41,458 $1.95 
6 5,918 35 222,230 6.3 98,467 1.80 
9 8,883 61 393,419 11.2 160,684 1.69 
12 11,878 83 530, 716 15.1 207,857 1.64 
15 14,782 101 699,963 19.9 264,552 1.61 
18 17,804 123 893,333 25.4 326,120 1.57 
21 20' 728 145 1,049,864 29.8 374,124 1.55 
24 23, 773 165 1,224,210 34.8 424,600 1.53 
Wheat $1.25 
3 2,859 12. 55,142 2.2 41,098 3.93 
6 5,889 .34 146,489 5.7 98,107 3.03 
9 8,872 61 259,466 10.2 160,684 2.63 
12 11,849 82 348,505 13.7 207,497 2.47 
15 14,861 101 462,358 18.1 266,037 2.36 
18 17,775 122 584,827 22.9 325,760 2.26 
21 20,699 144 686,201 26.9 373,764 2.20 
24 23,744 164 800, 729 31.4 424,240 2.13 
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There are several peculiarities associated with the three percent 
level when compared with higher levels of retirement. The average 
wheat allotment for the 12 or 13 farms in the three percent level was 
approximately 50 percent larger than the sample average. As the pro-
• gram moved into higher levels of retirement, the wheat acreage per farm 
approached the lower sample average, but the value of production per 
farm rose slightly. A rise in value of procluction per farm, accom-
I ; 
pained by a decline in the acreage, coul9 oµly come about from higher 
yields. Such a rise in yields was not indicated, however, in the ASCS 
projected yields. The higher values of production at higher retirement 
levels caused the percentage of production removed to exceed the per-
centage of land retired. 
One-Year Retirement of Feed Grain Bases 
Reflecting the lesser role of grain sorghum in three of the four 
study counties, 117 farms with 3,601 acres of feed grain base did not 
produce enough to cover variable costs. As shown in Tables XV and XLII, 
this program was capable of reaching only six percent of the total 
cropland and .. ·3.1 percent of the value of crops produced. 
At three percent land retirement the predominance of retired acre-
age comes from forage sorghum -- indicative of its generally marginal 
profitability. At six percent, however, grain sorghum moves into the 
lead. In total, farms entering this program are much above thesample 
average farm in size of feed grain base and acreage of sorghum grown • 
.. r 
The ASCS projected yield for program participants averages slightly 
less than the sample as a whole. 
TABLE XV 
THEORETICAL RANKING OF ONE-YEAR RETIREMENT OF FEED GRAIN BASES 
BY THREE PERCENT LAND INCREMENTS 
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Production 
Percent Number Percent Variable Retired Per 
of All Total of Value of of All Production Dollar of 
Cropland Acres Farms Production Production Costs Payment 
3 2,933 59 $ 37,401 1.1 $27,573 $3.81 
6 5,910 80 108,918 3.1 53,510 1.97 
Comparison of Theoretical Results 
The purpose of the entire presentation of data in the chapter up 
to this point has been to allow a factual comparison of a wide variety 
of programs under several sets of controlled conditions. Since this 
chapter is concerned with theoretical efficiencies, the results could 
in many cases have been predicted at the outset. Insofar as this was 
· the case, at least the analysis measured the size of the relative 
differences between programs. The analysis has also established bench-
marks against which will be measured to the farmers' stated payment 
requirements reported in the next chapter. 
For purposes of comparison this discussion will revolve around 
three sets of supply curves for land entering the various programs 
being considered. These curves are drawn using marginal costs -- the 
cost of obtaining the next farm -- at each retirement level. In 
addition the reciprocal of the efficiency value, payment per dollar of 
production retired, rather than production per dollar of payment is 
used on the vertical axis. Efficiency values given earlier in the 
tables are average figures for all farms included in programs up to a 
given retirement level. These differences make impossible direct 
comparison between the supply curves and the tables. 
For any program which involves a given type of land retirement 
at a given retirement level and set of crop prices, we expcet program 
efficiency to increase as the time period is extended. This is 
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apparent in the efficiency formula as more costs are included in the 
variable cost component in longer time periods. Figure 2 shows the 
relative performance of three programs to retire whole farms. Govern-
ment land purchases and cropping easements are of course extremely long .... 
term programs. They have a clear cost advantage over the ten-year pro-
gram. A ten-year retirement ~rogram costs from 13¢ to 29¢ more per 
dollar of production removed, depending on the level of retirement and 
the program with which it is compared. 
Figure 3 would appear to be a contradiction in that the ten-year 
retirement of poor cropland line crosses and exceeds the one-year line 
at retirement levels above eight percent of the cropland. This is a 
special case arising from the fact that almost all available land in 
the poorest cropland category is taken to enable the ten-year programs 
to reach 12 percent retirement. The last land entering the ten-year 
program at higher retirement levels raises the program costs sharply. 
Fewer poorest cropland segments were judged unprofitable in the one-
year program (because fewer costs are variable) and hence the one-year 
program drew parti.cipants from a larger list of farms with available 
cropland. 
Lest Figure 3 cast the ten-year retirement of poorest cropland 
with grazing permitted in an unfavorable light, a word of explanation 
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is necessary. Many farms were arbitrarily eliminated from this program 
because a conversion of their poorest cropland to permanent grazing 
would increase the net return from this land. It was not possible, 
therefore, to compute a payment that would induce these farms to parti-
cipate. The number of farms remaining, for which a theoretical payment 
could be computed, was smaller than the list of potential participants 
for the other programs. This factor has likely distorted marginal cost 
data for the grazing option program. 
Figure 4 compares several alternative short run programs. The cost 
advantage of the poorest cropland program is not as large as it appears. 
At a retirement level of 12 percent of cropland, only seven percent of 
the value of crop production has been removed. The wheat allotment 
program can remove the same amount of crop production by retiring only 
slightly more than six percent of the land. Thus the more relevant 
comparison is the 12 percent poorest land cost (57¢) with the six per-
cent wheat allotment cost (62¢) rather than the 12 percent wheat 
allotment cost (66¢). The wheat allotment program also has the 
highest potential in terms of the amount of production it can remove 
at fairly constant costs. 
The data for all three figures used in this discussion are based 
on an assumed wheat price of $2.00 per bushel. In the discussion of 
individual programs earlier in the chapter, it was amply demonstrated 
that a lower wheat price raises program efficiency. Since income 
maintenance is one of the stated goals of our supply control policies, 
allowing wheat to fall to $1.25 would offset part of the purpose of the 
programs. It is possible however to lower support prices, thereby 
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increasing program efficiencies, and use the savings obtained to pay a 
direct income subsidy to producers. 
By way of recapitulation, Table XVI shows a ranking of program 
alternatives on the basis of their theoretically computed average 
efficiency assuming a nine percent land retirement level and a price of 
$2.00 for wheat. Whole farm programs appear to have an advantage as 
this type program appears in the top three positions. Wheat allotment 
programs appear to be at a disadvantage. With the theoretical ranking 
established we will examine in the next chapter the efficiencies cal-
culated from farmers' asking rates. 
TABLE XVI 
EFFICIENCY RANKING OF PROGRAM ALTERNATIVES AT NINE PERCENT 
LAND RETIREMENT LEVEL, WHEAT $2.00 
Program Type 
Government purchase of entire cropland 
Cropping easement on entire cropland 
Ten-year retirement of entire cropland 
Cropping easement on poorest cropland 
Ten-year retirement of poorest cropland 
Government purchase of poorest cropland 
One-year retirement of poorest cropland 
Ten-year retirement of wheat allotment 
One-year retirement of wheat allotment 
Ten-year retirement' of poorest cropland 
with grazing permitted 
Te~-year retirement of feed grain base 
One-year retirement of feed grain base 
Average Efficiencya 
$4.88 
2.80 
2.49 
2.38 
2.18 
1.98 
1. 89 
1.87 
1.69 
b 
b 
b 
aProduction removed per dollar of program cost. 
b These programs were unable to achieve retirement of nine 
percent of the available cropland. 
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1 Sobering and 'l'weeten, p. 822. 
2 Larry Ja Conner, et. al., Alternative Crop Enterprises on Clay 
and Loam goiis of North Central Oklahoma (Oklahoma Agricultural Experi-
ment Station Pr~essed Series, No. P-550, Stillwater, 1966); Larry J. 
Connor, Roy E. Hatch, and Odel Walker, Alternative Crop Enterprises on 
Loam and Sandy Soils of Northwest Oklahoma (Oklahoma Agricultural 
Experiment Station Processed Series, No. P-552, Stillwater, 1966); 
John W. Green, Vernon R. Eidman, and Larry Peters, Alternative Irrigated 
Crop Enterprises ..Q.!l Clay and Sandy Loam Soils of the Oklahoma Panhandle 
(Oklahoma Agricultural Experiment Station Processed Series, P-554, 
Stillwater, 1967); P. Leo Strickland and Terry Dunn, Alternate Crop 
Enterprise Budgets !2!_ Dryland Production, Southwestern Oklahoma 
(Oklahoma Agricultural Experiment Station Processed Series, No. P-599, 
Stillwater, 1969). 
CHAPTER IV 
PROGRAM EFFICIENCIES BASED ON FARMERS' RESPONSES 
In the last chapter theoretical efficiencies were presented for 
the· various program alternatives. Efficiencies were based on the 
assumption that each farmer would participate in a program if it was 
his most profitable alternative. Also assumed was that the farmer and 
the researcher accurately knew the variable costs and returns from 
crop production for each production unit under consideration. 
In this chapter a different analytical technique is reported and 
a different set of assumptions is required. It is recognized here that 
goals other than profit maximization may influence farmers' decisions 
about program participation. A fuller discussion of these goals will 
be postponed, however, until the next chapter. It is still necessary, 
for meaningful analysis, that the farmer and the researcher know 
accurately the expected returns from crop production for each farm or 
part of the farm. Rather than variable costs, however, the researcher 
must use the amount of payment the farmer believes is necessary for 
him to participate in the program. 
How the farmer reaches a determination of a proper participation 
payment is known only to him. He takes into account among other things 
his idea of expected costs and returns, how long the program would 
freeze his managerial perogatives and what others think of the program 
in question. In fact, the figure given by a farmer when faced with a 
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hypothetical program may not even accurately correspond to his reaction 
in a real life situation. Nevertheless, in this chapter, program 
efficiencies are computed on the basis of the farmers' stated payment 
requirement for participation. Value of crop production is computed 
in a manner identical to that· used for theoretical efficiencies des-
cribed in the last chapter. 
For all program alternatives studied the sample is subdivided into 
three groups. In the first group are all farms that elected not to 
participate in the program. These farms are referred to in the dis-
cussion as nonparticipants. The second group consists of all farms 
·that stated a payment requirement for participation, but analysis 
indicated that. the payment requirement is more than the value of 
production removed. To retire these farms is unprofitable. for the 
Government, so they are referred to as unprofitable farms in the dis-
cussion. The third group contains farms which were willing to partici-
pate at a payment rate less than the gross value of production. 
Program participants were selected from the third group in a 
manner similar to the theoretical analysis. Farms were ranked from 
greatest to least efficiency within each county. To present land 
retirement from becoming focused heavily in certain local areas, the 
county list was truncated when 30 percent of the total cropland for 
that county sample was reached. The four county lists were combined 
and the farms ordered again from highest to lowest efficiency. The 
combined list was broken into segments representing three percent seg-
ments of the cropland base for the sample. Tabular data presented 
for each program alternative summarize the cumulative average 
efficiencies in three percent steps up to a maximum of 24 percent of 
the total cropland. It was not envisioned that land retirement in 
excess of 24 percent would become necessary. 
Government Purchase of Entire Cropland 
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The least popular land retirement program suggested in this survey 
was Government purchase of land. The magnitude of disfavor with which 
this program is held may be indicated by the fact that only 29 farms 
were offered in the sample survey. Of these 29, 12 were offered at a 
price so high that the annual cost of ownership to the Government (six 
and one half percent of the gross purchase price) was more than the 
value of production with wheat priced at $2.00. Three more of the 29 
became unprofitable at a wheat price of $1.25. The farms which re-
mained, amounting to three percent of the land in the sample are des-
cribed in Tables XVII and XLIII. 
It is unusual that although these farms accounted for only three 
percent of the land, they remove over four percent of the value of 
production. The farms included in this sample average about 1/5 
smaller in cropland acreage than the entire sample. In spite of this, 
sales per farm are about 1/5 higher than average for the sample. Pro-
gram participants average a higher proportion of land in wheat and 
cotton and are lower than the sample in proportion of land in sorghum, 
barley, hay, pasture, and fallow. Program farms do not have a larger 
wheat allotment than average, but do grow more wheat on their feed 
grain bases and barley, oat, and rye bases. Projected wheat yields 
are substantially above average while sorghum and cotton yields are 
substantially lower. 
TABLE XVII 
INDICATED RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT PURCHASE OF ENTIRE CROPLAND 
Percent Number Percent Annual 
of All Total of Value of of All Gross Land Ownership 
Cropland Acres Farms Production Production Cost Cost 
Wheat $2.00 
3 2,980 17 $171,860 4.8 $1,218,090 $79,276 
Wheat $1. 25 
3 2,786 15 109,763 4.3 1,079,750 70,184 
Production 
Retired Per 
Dollar of 
Cost 
$2.16 
1.56 
\JI 
\JI 
In summary it would appear that the purchase of some good farms, 
as described here, can be a profitable means of reducing crop produc-
tion. The extent to which it would be effective would be severely 
limited by the public attitude. 
Government Purchase of Poorest Cropland 
Although the purchase of entire farm cropland base retired only 
56 
a small acreage, the purchase by the Government of the poorest crop-
land category on farms retired even less acreage. To begin with, not 
all farms indicated a poorest cropland category, Of those farms which 
did, only 14 expressed a willingness to sell to the Government. At a 
wheat price of $2.00, five of these were worth buying; at $1.25 wheat 
only four were profitable buys. 
Tables XVIII and XLIV contain data for these tracts of cropland. 
Since only 0.1 percent of the land and a like percentage of value of 
production could be removed by this program, it is an ineffective 
alternative. 
Cropping Easement on Entire Cropland 
A cropping easement can accomplish many of the same objectives as 
Government land purchase and at the same time can overcome some of the 
objections. Cropping easement involves a single, one time payment; 
in this case a non-recourse, interest free loan to the participant. 
The time period can extend to perpetuity if not cancelled by either 
party -- thus reducing administrative costs. Title to the land and 
even use of the land for non-agricultural purposes remain in the private 
domain. The only questions remaining are: (1) is this program 
TABLE XVIII 
INDICATED RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT PURCHASE OF POOREST CROPLAND 
Percent Number Percent Annual 
of All Total of Value of of All Gross Land Ownership 
Cropland Acres Farms Production Production Cost Cost 
Wheat $2.00 
0.1 132 5 $4,287 0.1 $38,892 $2,528 
Wheat $1.25 
0.1 :i29 4 2,694 0.1 37,092 2,411 
Production 
Retired Per 
Dollar of 
Cost 
$1. 70 
1.12 
VI 
....... 
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efficient from the standpoint of production removed per dollar of cost? 
(2) Is this program sufficiently acceptable to farmers that a signifi-
cant reduction in production can be achieved? 
These questions are answered in Tables XIX and XLV. Over the 
range of acceptance in this sample, efficiencies varied between $3.70 
and $1.43 depending on the support price of wheat assumed and the level 
of land retirement desired. In the case of $2.00 wheat it was econo-
mically feasible to remove up to 15 percent of the land and 18 percent 
of the value of crop production. Even at a wheat price of $1.25 it 
was profitable to go as high as 12 percent of the land. There were 
still a number of farms that would not participate in this program and 
a large number that ask a loan so large that participation would not 
have been economically justified. 
The first farms that would be drawn into this program are slightly 
smaller than the sample average in terms of total crop acreage and 
value of production sold per farm. Beyond the six percent retirement 
level, however, they noticeably exceed the sample average for these 
two parameters. 
This program has attracted farms with a high proportion of land 
in wheat and a low proportion in hay, pasture, and fallow when compared 
with the sample. Sorghum projected yields are highest at the low 
retirement level and fall to average at higher levels of retirement. 
Wheat projected yields, on the other hand, start out lower than average 
and end up higher. Cotton acreage is insignificant at all levels of 
the program and the farms participating have a lower than average pro-
jected yield. 
Percent 
of All 
Cropland 
3 
6 
9 
12 
15 
3 
6 
9 
12 
TABLE XIX 
INDICATED RESPONSE TO CROPPING EASEMENT ON ENTIRE CROPLAND 
BY THREE PERCENT LAND INCREMENTS 
Number Percent Annual 
Total of Value of of All Cost at 
Acres Farms Production Production Gross Loan 6~% 
Wheat $2.00 
2,911 13 $102,374 2.9 $ 426,200 $ 27,704 
5,938 21 214,029 6.1 1,178,760 76,620 
8,959 32 371,975 10.6 2,506,270 162,908 
12,310 45 494,986 14.1 3, 727' 230 242,270 
14,802 56 637,578 18.1 5,515,060 358,479 
Wheat $1. 25 
2,846 13 72,187 2.8 418,076 27,175 
5,885 20 143,821 5.6 1,132,160 73,591 
9,216 30 241,997 9.5 2,301,030 149,567 
12,026 42 339' 196 13.3 3,650,800 237,302 
Production 
Retired Per 
Dollar of 
Cost 
$3.70 
2.79 
2.28 
2.04 
1. 78 
2.66 
1.95 
1.62 
1.43 
\JI 
\0 
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Cropping Easement on Poorest Cropland 
As in the case of the program to purchase the poorest cropland on 
each farm, a program for the purchase of easements on the poorest crop-
land drew no response on 216 of the 279 farms which designated some 
cropland as "poorest". In addition, 55 of those responding asked a 
loan so high that the annual cost to the Government would exceed the 
value of production when wheat was priced at $2.00. 
Tables XX and XLVI show the totals for the six to eight farms for 
which program participation would be desirable from the Government's 
standpoint. Acreages and value of production removed are insignificant. 
Ten-Year Retirement of Entire Cropland 
This program was one of the more familiar to those interviewed, 
i 
being known to thek previously as the "soil bank". A wide number of 
farms were offered for participation. Still there were 205 farms out 
of 421 that declined to quote a required payment for participation. 
Of the 216 farms that responded favorably, 66 asked a payment rate 
higher than the value of production with wheat price at $2.00. The 
number of unprofitable farms nearly doubled to 129 with wheat priced 
at $1. 25 
The data in Tables XXI and XLVII show that a con$iderable per-
centage of the cropland base can profitably be reached with a ten-year 
whole farm program. Efficiencies are high at all retirement levels, 
although the $1.25 program averages a little lower in efficiency and 
reaches its maximum at 18 percent of the land. 
This program can operate successfully and attract large viable 
farms. The percentage of production removed is larger than the 
TABLE XX 
INDICATED RESPONSE TO CROPPING EASEMENT ON POOREST CROPLAND 
Percent Number Percent Annual 
of All Total of Value of of All Gross Land Ownership 
Cropland Acres Farms Production Production Cost Cost 
Wheat $2.00 
0.2 211 8 $7,049 0.2 $64,938 $4,221 
Wheat $1.25 
0.1 94 6 2,896 0.1 25,185 1,637 
Production 
Retired Per 
Dollar of 
Cost 
$1.67 
1. 77 
°' f-' 
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percentage of land retired at all levels. The farms in this program 
average between $1,700 and $2,000 more in value of production per farm 
than the sample. In lower levels of land retirement the effect on 
cotton and grain sorghum is particularly strong. At higher levels of 
retirement wheat is retired at an accelerated rate. There appears to 
be no trend in any of the projected yields from lowest levels of 
participation. 
TABLE XXI 
INDICATED RESPONSE TO TEN-YEAR RETIREMENT OF ENTIRE CROPLAND 
BY THREE PERCENT LAND INCREMENTS 
Production 
Percent Number Percent Retired Per 
of All Total of Value of of All Annual Dollar of 
Cropland Acres Farms Production Production Payment Payment 
Wheat $2.00 
3 3,162 15 $ 150,453 4.3 $ 53,466 $2.81 
6 5,917 25 290,181 8.2 113,136 2.56 
9 8,448 34 406,139 11.5 163,191 2.49 
12 11, 859 51 560,364 15.9 238, 971 2.34 
15 14,890 65 718,072 20.4 331, 118 2.17 
18 17,763 82 864,965 24.6 426,762 2.03 
21 20,734 93 980, 714 27.9 509,412 1.93 
24 23,684 103 1,089,824 31.0 591, 242 1.84 
Wheat $1. 25 
3 2,951 13 106,348 4.2 47,350 2.25 
6 5, 711 25 197,956 7.8 102,517 1.93 
9 8,865 39 315,998 12.4 180,904 1. 75 
12 11, 871 50 400,105 15.7 240,868 1.66 
15 14' 696 64 501,599 119. 7 321,089 1.56 
18 17,675 76 609,510 ·,;. 23.9 416,916 1.46 
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Ten-Year Retirement of Poorest Cropland 
As with other part farm programs directed toward the poorest crop-
land category discussed thus far, a significant level of land or crop 
production cannot be profitably retired in this manner. Those eligible 
who did not wish to participate numbered 173, and 86 to 89 more would 
have been unprofitable from the standpoint of the Government. 
Tables XXII and XLVIII show the total profitable participation 
available. Less than one percent of land and production were obtained. 
TABLE XXII 
INDICATED RESPONSE TO TEN-YEAR RETIREMENT OF POOREST CROPLAND 
Percent Number Percent 
of All Total of Value of of All Annual 
Cropland Acres Farms Production a Production Payment 
Wheat $2.00 
0.6 545 21 $15,193 0.4 $8,634 
Wheat $1. 25 
0.5 457 18 9,883 0.4 6,410 
aOriginal value of production minus value of grazing. 
Ten-Year Retirement of Poorest Cropland 
With Grazing Permitted 
Production 
Retired Per 
Dollar of 
Payment 
$1. 76 
1.54 
It would seem plausible that allowing grazing on land diverted 
from crop production would both elicit more participation and reduce 
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the payment required by farmers. Judging from the responses shown in 
Table XXIII, allowing grazing has a negligible effect on response. 
Only five more farms were offered. It resulted in two more profitable 
farms when wheat was priced at $2.00 and no additional profitable farms 
at $1.25. The amount of land retired and the value of production 
removed are insignificant. 
TABLE XXIII 
INDICATED RESPONSE TO TEN-YEAR RETIREMENT OF POOREST CROPLAND 
WITH GRAZING PERMITTED 
Production 
Percent Number Percent Retired Per 
of All Total of Value of of All Annual Dollar of 
Cropland Acres Farms Production a Production Payment Payment 
Wheat $2.00 
0.5 467 23 $10, 776 0.3 $5,525 $1.95 
Wheat $1.25 
0.4 347 18 5,113 0.2 3,395 1.51 
aOriginal value of production minus value of grazing. 
Ten-Year Retirement of Wheat Allotment 
Under this program the farm would not be allowed to produce wheat 
and would be required to retire an acreage of cropland the size of the 
wheat allotment~ All but five of the 421 farms were eligible by means 
of having a wheat allotment. Of those eligible, 213 indicated a 
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payment rate at which they would be willing to participate. With wheat 
valued at $2.00, 39 of these farms were rejected as asking more than 
the value of production. When wheat was priced at $1.25 the number of 
unprofitable farms increased to 92. 
Tables XXIV and L show the extent and effect of participation in 
this program. It is possible to remove a large percentage of land 
through this means. The percentage of production removed is in excess 
of the percentage of land. 
TABLE XXIV 
INDICATED RESPONSE TO TEN-YEAR RETIREMENT OF WHEAT ALLOTMENTS 
BY THREE PERCENT LAND INCREMENTS 
Production 
Percent Number Percent Retired Per 
of All Total of Value of of All Annual Dollar of 
Cropland Acres Farms Production Production Payment Payment 
Wheat $2.00 
3 2,962 18 $ 177,471 5.0 $ 46,887 $3.78 
6 5,970 43 368,822 10.5 114,554 3.22 
9 8, 931 67 565,468 16.1 197' 716 2.86 
12 11,862 84 728,974 20.7 276,847 2.63 
15 14,694 102 909,381 25. 8 374,669 2.43 
18 17,833 121 1,090,359 31.0 484,574 2.25 
21 20,487 134 1,196,732 34.0 556,859 2.15 
24 23,642 147 1,328,668 37.7 655,977 2.03 
Wheat $1.25 
3 2,962 18 115,803 4.5 46,887 2.47 
6 5,834 41 228,985 9.0 107,588 2.13 
9 8,931 67 369,384 14.5 197' 716 1.87 
12 ll,860 85 478,084 18.7 278,904 1. 71 
15 14,844 102 591,360 23.2 374,018 1.58 
18 17,748 121 707 ,677 27.7 482,699 1.47 
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Farmers did not differentiate between the $2.00 price of wheat and 
the lower wheat price when responding to this question. Thus, only one 
payment requirement was given per farm. The result of this is a natur-
ally lower efficiency for the $1.25 program. 
At the three percent level of land retirement, wheat acreage per 
farm averaged 50 percent larger than the sample acreage. Nearly one-
quarter of the wheat acreage was grown on feed grain or other bases 
under the substitution provision of the wheat and feed grain programs. 
Wheat projected yields were lowest at the three percent land retire-
ment level. At higher retirement levels the average wheat acreage per 
farm dropped to the sample average, but the yield increased by about 
three bushels per acre. 
Ten-Year Retirement of Feed Grain Base 
Only 219 of the 421 sample farms had feed grain bases. Some of 
the 219 used their feed grain bases for wheat production. Some others 
used the feed grain base solely for the production of forage sorghum 
which was consumed on the farm. Thus, less than half the feed grain 
bases in the sample was actually used in the production of grain 
sorghum. 
Of the 219 bases examined, 107 farms were not interested in parti-
cipating in ten-year retirement from feed grain production and retire-
ment of an acreage of cropland equal to the feed grain base. Of those 
who stated a payment requirement for participation, 88 asked more than 
the value of production. 
The remaining 24 farms are detailed in Tables XXV and LI. Only 
1.8 percent of the land and 2.2 percent of the value of crop production 
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can be removed by this program. Yet it is a program which is attrac-
tive to the larger feed grain producer. The 24 farms averaged_ 68 acres 
of grain sorghum actually grown -- about six times as large as the 
sample average. Projected yields of participants averaged over ten 
percent higher than the sample. 
TABLE XXV 
INDICATED RESPONSE TO TEN-YEAR RETIREMENT OF FEED GRAIN BASES 
Production 
Percent Number Percent Retir~d Per 
of All Total of Value of of All Annual Dollar of 
Cr~pland Acres Farms Production Production Payment Payment 
,; 
1.8 ·· 1 812 24 $77 ,054 2.2 $39,179 $1.97 ; 
' ' 
One-Year Retirement of Poorest Cropland 
Retirement of poorest cropland was more popular on a one-year 
basis than for any other time period. The number of farms not at all 
interested was 133, which was 40 less than for the ten-year program. 
However, the number of farms that would be rejected for asking more 
than value of production was 25 higher when wheat was valued at $2.00 
.. 
and 28 higher at $1.25 wheat. Thus, most of the prospective new 
participants would not be accepted in the selection process. 
Tables XXVI and LII show the acreage and produc~ion that would 
enter the program on a profitable basis. As in the case of other poor 
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land, part farm retirement programs, the impact on value of production 
is too small to be effective. 
TABLE XXVI 
INDICATED RESPONSE TO ONE-YEAR RETIREMENT OF POOREST CROPLAND 
Production 
Percent Number Percent Retired Per 
of All Total of Value of of All Annual Dollar of 
Cropland Acres Farms Production Production Payment Payment 
Wheat $2.00 
0.9 861 36 $24,558 o. 7 $13,955 $1. 77 
Wheat $1. 25 
0.8 743 30 16, 672 0.8 11,031 1.51 
One-Year Retirement of Wheat Allotment 
This was the only program alternative in which the farmer, when 
interviewed, actually quoted one payment requirement assuming that 
wheat was supported at $2.00 and another payment requirement for wheat 
at $1.25. In previous programs studied no wheat price was stated to 
the farmer when the question was asked. Even when given the oppor-
tunity to revise his answers depending on the support price, the farmer 
stated payment requirements gave a lower efficiency to the $1. 25 wheat 
. program. Farmers did not reduce their payment requirements in propor-
tion to the drop in net income per acre that would result from the 
lower wheat price. 
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As in the case of other one-year programs, this alternative drew 
a higher rate of participation than the ten~year allotment retirement 
program. Less than one-third refused participation outright. The 
unprofitable category contained 59 with wheat at $2.00 and 83 with the 
$1.25 price. 
Tables XXVII and LIII show the effect of retiring as much as 24 
percent of the cropland base. Percentage of production removed runs 
50 percent to 100 percent ahead of the percentage of acreage retired. 
Efficiencies are high and remain high through a significant level of 
production removal. Both the $2.00 program and the $1.25 program drew 
farms which produced wheat in acreages above the size of their wheat 
allotments through the substitution of feed grain and other bases. 
While the farms included in both programs had wheat allotments that 
were very close to the sample average, the acreage of wheat produced 
per farm at all levels of both programs was about 20 percent greater 
than the sample mean. 
One-Year Retirement of Feed Grain Base 
As with other short-term programs, a one-year retirement of feed 
grain bases was more popular than a similar ten-year program. The 
number of farms willing to participate was 13 more than with the ten-
year program. Unfortunately, nine of these prospective new partici-
pants landed in the unprofitable category. 
Only slightly more land and value of production were removed by a 
one-year feed grain retirement program than by a ten-year program. 
Cropland retired was less than three percent. The data are summarized 
in Tables XXVIII and LIV. 
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TABLE XXVII 
INDICATED RESPONSE TO ONE-YEAR RETIREMENT OF WHEAT ALLOTMENTS 
BY THREE PERCENT LAND INCREMENTS 
Production 
Percent Number Percent Retired Per 
of All Total of Value of of All Annual Dollar of 
Cropland Acres Farms Production Production Payment Payment 
Wheat $2.00 
3 3,029 25 $ 241,534 6.9 $ 69,832 $3.46 
6 5,938 48 419,069 11.9 136,503 3.07 
9 8,844 65 618,695 17.7 219,247 2.82 
12 ll, 836 84 807,785 22.9 304,074 2.66 
15 14,757 llO 1,002,852 28.5 401,860 2.50 
18 17,914 127 1,176,698 33.4 498,444 2.36 
21 20,742 161 1,336,375 38.0 593,319 2.25 
24 24,145 178 1,470,879 41.8 679,372 2.16 
Wheat $1. 25 
3 2,933 20 107,895 4.2 30,269 3.56 
6 5,959 42 242,037 9.5 85,023 2.85 
9 8,891 63 360,467 14.1 138,869 2.60 
12 ll, 791 84 472,261 18.5 193,993 2.43 
15 14,835 105 606,732 23.8 268,555 2.26 
18 17,649 117 702,426 27.5 326,320 2.15 
21 20,763 135 818, 963 32.1 401,127 2.04 
24 23,649 153 928,795 36.4 476,212 1.95 
TABLE XXVIII 
INDICATED RESPONSE TO ONE-YEAR RETIREMENT OF FEED GRAIN BASES 
Production 
Percent Number Percent Retired Per 
of All Total of Value of of All Annual Dollar of 
Cropland. Acres Farms Production Production Payment Payment 
2.2 2,189 28 $85,789 2.4 $53,528 $1.60 
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Comparison of Program Alternatives 
In the previous chapter on theoretical efficiencies it was stated 
that an efficiency ranking of the various programs could almost be 
made before any analysis was done. This foreknowledge was possible 
because the efficiencies were calculated from a formula -- the compo-
nents of which were known to vary in a certain consistent manner. Not 
so. in this chapter where efficiencies are based on the farmers' stated 
payment requirements. Here the analysis takes on the nature of a series 
of contests. A program popularity contest by the farmer, in which he 
votes for his favorites by indicating how willing he is to participate. 
A contest on the part of the Government, in which it accepts for 
participation those farms which will accomplish the program goals at a 
minimum of cost. 
Even though the analysis of this chapter is based on the assump-
tion of price discrimination on the part of the Government, the results 
are somewhat comparable to present practice in the real world. Govern-
ment program payments vary among farmers to some extent on the basis of 
yield differences. Although yield differences do not explain all the 
variation in farmers' willingness to participate in programs, at least 
to some degree the Government pays according to the production it 
removes. 
For purposes of comparison, the discussion will center around the 
four most popular programs: cropping easements on entire cropland 
units, ten-year retirement of wheat allotments, ten-year retirement of 
entire cropland units, and one-year retirement of wheat allotments. Of 
the 12 program alternatives, only these four programs were able to re-
tire more than three percent of the cropland base in the sample. 
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These four programs are ranked in Table XXIX on the basis of their 
average efficiency, computed from farmers' indicated response assuming 
a nine percent retirement level and a price of $2.00 for wheat. The 
average efficiencies were tested with a 11 t 11 test procedure. The differ-
ence between the ten-year and one-year wheat allotment retirement pro-
grams was not statistically significant at the five percent level. The 
difference between all other program pairs were significant at the five 
percent level. 
TABLE XXIX 
RESPONSE EFFICIENCY RANKING OF PROGRAM ALTERNATIVES 
AT NINE PERCENT LAND RETIREMENT LEVEL, 
a Program Type 
WHEAT $2.00 
Ten-year retirement of wheat 
allotment 
One-year retirement of wheat 
allotment 
Ten-year retirement of entire 
cropland 
Cropping easement on entire 
cropland 
Average Efficiencyb 
$2.86 
2.82 
2.49 
2.28 
a All other program alternatives were unable to 
achieve retirement of nine percent of available crop-
land. 
b Production removed' per dollar of program cost. 
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The marginal costs of retiring land under the four alternative 
programs are shown in Figure 5. The vertical axis shows the payment 
per dollar of production retired -- the reciprocal of the program 
efficiency values used in the data tables. Figure 5 also differs from 
the data tables in that the graph is based on marginal costs at each 
level of retirement, while the efficiencies given in the tables are 
based on average values .for all retirement up to the specified level. 
The retirement programs directed against wheat allotments show a 
higher efficiency at all levels than whole farm retirement programs. 
Although Figure 5 shows a cost advantage for wheat allotment programs 
of around ten cents per dollar of production retired; the real differ-
1 
ence is greater. At the level of 12 percent land retirement the two 
wheat allotment programs are actually retiring between 20.7 percent and 
22.9 percent of the value of crop production. Thus, as much production 
can be removed by retiring six percent of the land under the allotment 
programs as by retiring 12 percent of the land.under the whole farm 
program. 
It should be pointed out, however, that the whole farm programs 
are effective in the control of a variety of crops, including feed 
grains and cotton as well as wheat. The use of a wheat allotment pro-
gram would not solve the all problem of oversupply in other crops, but 
it would make less wheat available for feed. In this study program 
alternatives directed toward retirement of feed grain bases were not 
successful in the economical removal of much more than two percent of 
the value of crop production. Perhaps, the sample area was atypical 
in this regard. No cotton allotment program was included in the study. 
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CHAPTER V 
COMPARISON OF PROGRAM RANKINGS BETWEEN 
THEOREtICAL RATES AND FARMERS' 
ASKING RATES 
If all farmers interviewed acted according to the profit maximizing 
assumptions stated at the beginning of Chapter III there would be no 
need for this chapter. On the other hand, it would be naive to assume 
that those whose actions do not conform to our theoretical analysis 
were impractical, ignorant, or failed to take advantage of opportunity. 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the differences between the 
theoretical ranking and the farmers' ranking of the various program 
alternatives. In particular, we are interested in defining the nature 
and extent of such differences ~nd what factors might be associated 
with them in a causal sense. 
The goal of a farm manager might be broadly defined as maximiza-
tion of his utility subject to political, economic, and other environ-
mental restraints. This definition is useful only in the broad sense 
because a farm manager's utility function cannot be spe~ified accurately 
and may be heavily affected by his family, creditors and others of 
influence. 
In most forms of economic analysis, the problem of utility defini-
tion is dealt with by assuming that profit maximization comes closer 
to utility maximization than any other measurable concept. This 
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approach ignores the effect of attitudes, values, and interests which 
the farm manager weaves into his d~cision making process. In fact, 
it is virtually impossible for the theoretical analysis to consider 
any parameters except those which relate solely to the farm, thereby 
ignoring those parameters which relate to the manager. 
As the data which follows will illustrate, the 197 farm owner-
operators or tenant-operators in this sample did not respond as if 
short-run profit maximization was their overriding goal. It does not 
appear that their actions were always designed to maximize the present 
value of the discounted stream of profits over the planning horizon. 
Increasing the size of the. farming operation in terms of dollar sales 
and acres was important to some :decision makers. Belief in a set of I , 
values about what was "good" and "bad" influenced many of the answers 
given. 
In using the data for the farmers' indicated program responses, 
it must be remembered that the responses are merely stated intentions. 
There is always present an undefined gap between the stated participa-
tion intentions or payment requirements and the actual performance in 
a genuine situation. It is likely that this performance gap is greatest 
for more complicated or less familiar programs. The farmers' response 
may indicate low cost-effectiveness for a complicated or strange 
program, but actual cost-effectiveness likely would improve after 
farmers were exposed to the program for some time. 
Table XXX compares and contrasts the order of ranking achieved by 
each method of analysis the theoretical versus the farmers' stated 
payment requirements. The standard error -- a measure of reliability 
is given for each .estimated mean. There are several points of agreement 
TABLE XXX 
COMPARISON OF THEORETICAL AND FARMER PROGRAM RANKINGS AT NINE PERCENT 
LAND RETIREMENT LEVEL, WHEAT $2.00 
Theoretical Farmer ResEonse 
Standard Standard 
Error of Error of 
Program Ranking Efficiency a Estimate Ranking Efficiency a Estimate 
Government purchase of entire cropland 1 4.88 1.22 b b 
Government purchase of poorest cropland 6 1.98 .85 b b 
Cropping easement on entire cropland 2 2.80 1.56 4 2.28 .21 
Cropping easement on poorest cropland 4 2.38 1.58 b b 
Ten-year retirement of entire cropland 3 2.49 .28 3 2.49 .20 
Ten-year retirement of poorest cropland 5 2.18 5.62 b b 
Ten-year retirement of poorest cropland 
with grazing permitted b b b b 
Ten-year retirement of wheat allotment 8 1.87 .55 1 2.86 .61 
Ten-year retirement of feed grain base b b b b 
One-year retirement of poorest cropland 7 1.89 2.47 b b 
One-year retirement of wheat allotment 9 1.69 .29 2 2.82 .44 
One-year retirement of feed grain base b b b b 
aProduction removed per dollar of program cost. 
bLess than nine percent of the available cropland would be retired under these programs. 
-...J 
-...J 
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concerning which programs might be ineffective: (1) ten-year retirement 
of poorest cropland with grazing permitted, (2) ten-year retirement of 
feed grain bases, and (3) one-year retirement of feed grain bases. 
There is also the interesting, although probably insignificant, coinci-
dence between methods of analysis in ranking and efficiency of the 
ten-year retirement of farms' entire cropland. Five programs which 
were indicated to be workable by the theoretical analysis were designated 
ineffective by the farmer analysis. There were four programs which both 
methods of analysis found effective, but the order of program efficiency 
ranking was nearly opposite. In one case, cropping easements on entire 
cropland units, the theoretical production removed per dollar of pro-
gram cost appeared higher than the efficiency based on the farmers' 
stated payment requirement. The difference between the theoretical 
mean efficiency and the mean efficiency as determined from farmers' 
responses was not statistically significant at the five percent level 
when tested by the "t" procedure. In two programs of wheat allotment 
retirement, the theoretical efficiency was lower than the efficiency 
computed from farmers' stated requirement. In both cases the differ-
ences in mean efficiencies given by the two methods of analysis are 
significant at the five percent level using a "t" test. 
The individual farms participating in each program under the 
"theoretical" column of Table XXX are, for the most part, not the same 
individual farms participating under the "farmer response" column. In 
each method of analysis farms were included in each program in 
decreasing order of the farms' efficiencies. The ranking achieved in 
one method of analysis in no way affects the ranking in the other 
method. For example, the ten-year wheat allotment program (wheat 
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$2.00) contained 59 farms at the nine percent retirement level in the 
theoretical analysis. The analysis of farmers' responses for this 
program had 67 farms. There were only two farms common to both methods 
at the nine percent retirement level. 
Why did some of the best ranked programs under the theoretical 
analysis fail to make the grade under the farmers' stated payment 
requirements analysis? In the case of Government purchase of crop-
land, whether it be of the entire cropland u~it or of the poorest land 
category, the overwhelming number of farmers. disapproved of this type 
i 
of action by the Government. Only four perc~nt of the farmers polled 
approved of this approach. 
Programs designed to retire only a portion of each farm -- in this 
case the poorest cropland category -- failed because of the nature of 
the typical cropping system followed in the sample area. The average 
sample farm consisted of 234 acres of cropland and held 196 acres of 
bases and allotments. Some bases and allotments -- feed grain and 
cotton -- allowed and/or required a percentage of diversion in the year 
the sample was taken. Some farmers did not use their full allotments 
and bases due to use of the fallow practice, weather conditions, con-
servation considerations, anµ other factors. The result was a sample 
average per farm of 164 acres in wheat, feed grains of all types, and 
"·" 
cotton; 17 acres in hay and pasture; and 53 acres of fallow. Those 
279 farms which designated a poorest cropland category averaged 59 
acres of poorest land per farm. For the'most part, fallow, hay, and 
pasture fall into this segment of the farm. The g~oss value of crop 
production on these acreages is' only $14.80 per acte. Thus, part-farm 
programs, which, result only in the retirement of each farm's poorest 
land, include a considerable proportion of fallow land and remove a 
relatively sl;liall amount of crop production per acre. 
Why did the two best farmer ranked programs -- wheat allotment 
retirement for ten years or one year -- have a higher efficiency than 
their theoretical computed efficiency? It could be assumed that, 
since a theoretical efficiency is based on the minimum payment neces-
sary to secure the farm's participation, theoretical efficiencies 
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would always be higher than those obtained in actual cases. The 
assumption would continue that the farmer would likely ask a little 
more than his theoretically computed net income to forego gambling on 
the possibility of a better crop or a better price. In the case of 
three of four programs ranked by farmers, the efficiency based on 
"bids" by farmers was equal to or higher than the theoretical program 
efficiency. In these three programs, the farmer required less than or 
only as much as his theoretically computed net income. It appears that 
in the one to ten-year span of these programs, farmers were willing 
to reduce their net income somewhat to eliminate variability in their 
yearly income stream. It is also possible that the farmers' estimates 
of costs and returns differed from those used in the theoretical 
analysis. 
The cropping easement program ranked the lowest of the four 
effective programs in the farmer analysis. This is in contrast to its 
number two ranking in the theoretical analysis. Likewise, the 
theoretical efficiency value for this program was higher than the 
farmer computed efficiency. Farmers are accustomed to making program 
participation decisions based on the annual payment offered. In the 
easement program, they were told they would receive one lump cash sum 
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in the form of a non-recourse, non-interest loan. In effect, their 
annual payment would become the amount this loan would earn while in 
their control. It was difficult for farmers, in the course of the 
interview, to arrive at an accurate answer for this unfamiliar program. 
Perhaps due to this situation, over 70 percent of those farms in the 
sample would not be offered for participation in the program. 
Three programs had sufficient built-in disadvantages to cause 
their rejection by both methods of analysis. Farms with feed grain 
bases numbered 219, the smallest subset in the sample of 421. The 
strong role played by sorghum in on-the-farm livestock programs caused 
farmers to be reluctant about retiring this acreage. Only slightly 
more than 50 percent of feed grain base holders would cite a pay~ent 
requirement for participation. The average size of a feed grain base 
was 52 acres·for those farms that had such a base. In·comQination, 
the factors of small numbers of bases, small base sizes and farmers' 
reluctance to change their livestock program resulted in a very low 
potential effectiveness for a feed grain retir~ment program in the 
geograp~ic area of this sample • 
• The program to retire the poorest cropland category and allow it 
to be grazed was also prejudiced by several existing conditions. If 
the farm was not presently supporting a livestock enterprise, the acre-
age affected by this program was usually too small to justify the cost 
of establishing such an enterprise. For these farms, the program was 
no better than the poorest cropland retirement program without the 
grazing privilege. If the poorest land retired could be productively 
used for grazing, in most cases the returns from grass were equal to 
the returns from wheat or feed grains production and little overall 
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reduction in the value of crop production took place. Failure of 
farmers to distinguish adequately between the profitability of marginal 
and better land may also have limited their willingness to retire poor 
land. It is also possible that some farmers recognized that a cost-
effective program must reduce production and they were unwilling to 
retire poor land that would not contribute to this objective. 
Chapter VI will follow with a discussion of the conclusions and 
their implications drawn from the comparisons outlined above. 
CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The overall objective of this study is to analyze the cost-
effectiveness of a variety of Government programs to control farm pro-
duction. The large number of possible programs are not equally 
efficient in use of public funds to reduce production and raise farm 
income. Results of this study are intended to provide policy makers 
with guidelines useful in constructing a coordinated and efficient 
supply control program for agriculture. 
Procedure 
Two separate, but somewhat complementary, methods of analysis are 
used in this study. The first is a theoretical analysis based on esti-
mated costs and returns for each separate farming unit in the sample. 
It is assumed that each farming unit will participate when the program 
payment equals or exceeds normal returns over variable costs. The 
second part is based on payments which each farm manager (either 
owner-operators or tenant-operators) stated are necessary to obtain 
his farm's participation. The various program alternatives studied 
are compared within each type of analysis and also between the two 
analyses. 
With both forms of analysis, the assumption of perfect price 
discrimination is used to construct a land supply schedule for each 
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program. First, a payment requirement is established for each farm as 
specified by the assumed program. In the theoretical analysis, this 
is computed as the expected returns minus the variable costs. In the 
second analysis, it is the farmer's stated requirement. Next, the 
ratio of value of production removed per dollar of payment is computed 
for each farm. For each program alternative, all farms are ranked from 
highest to lowest on the basis of this ratio. As the supply schedule 
is constructed for each program, the farms are drawn from the ranked 
list, with the result that farms with the highest program efficiency 
ratio are included first. The supply schedule is completed when all 
farms on the list have been included or when the required level of 
land retirement has been reached. 
In both analyses, the amount of cropland acreage allowed to be 
retired from each county is limited to 30 percent of the county sample 
cropland base. Those farms that would not be offered for participation 
in the farmer stated requirement method of analysis are given an 
efficiency ratio value of zero and thus never enter the supply schedule 
for that program alternative. All farms are considered eligible for 
participation in the theoretical analysis. 
Results 
A successful and efficient program is defined in this study as 
having the following attributes. It removes more than a dollar of 
crop production per dollar of program payment. It attracts sufficient 
participation to allow significant reductions in farm production. How 
a given program alternative scores with respect to each of these 
attributes depends on such factors as its time span, the type of land 
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or crop it is designed to retire, its popularity with farmers and the 
size of the potential acreage pool that is eligible for participation. 
Identifying successful and efficient programs is only part of the 
task. Identifying programs which are likely to be poorly suited to the 
problem of supply control is also important. Also important is the 
efficiency of one relative to another of the various successful programs. 
Both the theoretical and the empirical analyses described earlier 
have been used by a number of researchers to measure the effectiveness 
of various programs in different situations. It has generally been 
assumed that the choice of analytical method has little effect on the 
results, the choice being largely based on the type of data available. 
This study shows to what extent the two methods of analysis are compli-
mentary and where they might be contradictory. 
The best programs in the theoretical analysis are those which 
retire whol~ farms from crop production. In decreasing order of 
efficiency, these whole-farm programs are Government purchase of crop-
land, cropping easements by means of Government loans, and ten-year 
retirement. The next best group of programs theoretically are those 
which retire the poorest cropland segment on each farm. These Eart-f arm 
programs in decreasing order of efficiency are cropping easements, ten-
year retirement, Government land purchase, and one-year retirement. 
The theoretical analysis identifies as unsuccessful a program 
which would retire the feed grain base and an equivalent cropland 
acreage for one or ten years and a program to retire for ten years the 
poorest cropland on each farm, but allow it to be grazed. In the feed 
grain retirement case, there is an insufficient acreage of profitable 
feed grain production to effect a significant reduction in crop output. 
The retirement of poorest cropland with grazing allowed fails because 
in a considerable number of instances the value of grazing would be 
larger than the present value of crop production. 
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Of the 12 alternative programs considered in this study, only four 
remain successful in the analysis of farmers' stated payment require-
ments. The two most efficient programs are part-farm retirement plans. 
In decreasing order of efficiency, the best part-farm programs are 
ten-year retirement of wheat allotments with an equivalent acreage of 
cropland diverted to soil conserving uses and the same program with a 
one year life. Next in order of efficiency are two whole-farm programs: 
ten-year farm retirement and cropping easements. 
All other programs considered are determined to be inefficient 
by the analysis of farmers' responses. The Government land purchase 
program was eliminated because of a low level of indicated participa-
tion. In general, part-farm programs directed only against the poorest 
cropland were eliminated on the basis of low indicated participation 
and payment requirements in excess of present value of production. 
A comparison of the results of the two analyses leads to a third 
set of conclusions. Farmers have a tendency to overprice their poorest 
land and its crop production and underprice the most productive and 
valuable land. This phenomena can be seen in the number of large 
extensively cropped farms participating in the successful programs of 
the farmer response analysis. It can also be viewed in the large 
number of farms offered for participation in poorest cropland retirement 
programs, but rejected because payment requirements were in excess of 
value of production. 
If all other factors are held constant, ther~ seems to be little 
difference in efficiency between a one-year program and a ten-year 
I 
program. The theoretical anal~sis gives a more favorable efficiency 
ratio to the longer-term program. The farmer response analysis indi-
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cates a higher percentage of farms willing to participate in a one-year 
program. More costs'are variable, therefore efficiency should be 
higher with long term contracts. But this tendency may have been offset 
by farmer expectations for higher prices engendered by the "feed the 
world" psychology of the mid 1960's. 
I 
· A given program may be more or less efficient and successful 
when viewed in light of the farmers' responses than would be indicated 
by a purely theoretical analysis based on returns over variable costs. 
Itis apparent that farmers attach some value to stability of income 
when a program also is consistent with their beliefs and goals. Like-
wise, certain programs are never subjected to an objective economic 
evaluation by farmers because the program is unacceptable on philoso-
phical grounds. 
Implications 
Not all of the possible programs to control crop production are 
included in this study. In addition to programs different from those 
in this study, it is ppssible to modify or combine the 12 programs 
presented here into numerous other program alternatives. The following 
generalizations are offered in the hope they will be helpful in situa-
tions not specifically covered by the programs studied •. 
In no case does the farmer response analysis rate a program as 
efficient or successful that is not similarly rated by the theoretical 
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analysis. Thus, it would seem that approval by means of the theore-
tical analysis is a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for success. 
Since the theoretical method of analysis is usually less expensive and 
easier to perform than the farmer response analysis, this approach can 
be a useful screening device to identify those program alternatives 
worthy of more intensive analysis. 
A program must be directed toward a base of adequate size to be 
successful in a given geographic area. It might be hypothesized that 
''·a. feed grain diversion program would be quite popular in Oklahoma and 
.other southern plains states since feed grain is not the chief cash 
crop here. The tendency· revealed by this study indicates that programs 
directed against minor crops are more likely to be ignored than popular. 
In a similar manner, part-farm programs affecting only a small acreage 
of each farm are considered more of a nuisance than a relevant alterna-
tiv~ in the cropping system. Thus, a successful program is characte-
1 \ 
rized as one which has a large base of eligible participants, where 
the base is large both in terms of numbers of farming units and acreage. 
A successful and efficient program must be directed toward some-
thing that is worth retiring. This criterion requires a knowledge of 
the prevailing cropping systems and also a good estimate of the 
cropping system that would prevail if present programs were eliminated. 
By way of example is the case of retiring the poorest cropland category 
on each farm -- part-farm retirement on a small portion of the cropland 
base. This land is already in fallow or crops of low value for the 
most part.· Retiring it for a payment, particularly if grazing is in 
turn allowed, accomplishes little. Neither is maximum efficiency 
obtained by directing a program against bases or allotments that are 
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already grossly underutilized. Only slightly more than 60 percent of 
the feed grain base is actually planted to feed grain in this study. 
Less than '70 percent of the cotton allotment is planted. In both cases, 
these percentages would be lower if the farmer did not have to plant 
the crop to receive the production subsidy. It is instructive that 
the most successful and efficient program revealed in the farmer 
response analysis is wheat allotment retirement, a crop of high value 
per acre and an allotment that is over 90 percent planted. 
For a program to be readily accepted by farmers, it must be 
familiar -- or at least simple. The more extensive the "may" and "may 
not" list, the less participation it will attract. The more difficult 
the annual. cash value of the program payment is to compute, the more 
payment farmers will require to participate. The cropping easement 
program is diminished in acceptance because it is unheard of by 
farmers. It is diminished in efficiency because farmers are accustomed 
to receiving an annual payment for program participation rather than a 
once and for all loan. 
It is conceivable that the present system of voluntary program 
payment has at least encouraged the tendency of farmers to overprice 
poor land and underprice their best land. Present programs provide 
for payment on the basis of projected yield for each farm. The 
mechanics by which these projected yields are assigned to individual 
farms, however, often understates the real differences among farms. 
Once the projected yield is assigned to the farm, it becomes the 
average for all acreage of that crop on the farm. When a farmer 
diverts part of a crop, he tries to divert the poorest land and collect 
for the average. Several alternative methods might be more effective 
in matching the payment for each unit of production to its marginal 
revenue. One commonly discussed method is allowing each farmer to 
offer units of production through a sealed bid. The Government would 
then rank all bids received from best to least efficiency and accept 
sufficient bids to achieve the desired reduction in crop production. 
Limitations 
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Part of the contradiction between the results of the theoretical 
analysis and the farmer response analysis may be caused by the variable 
cost assumptions. The theoretical assumption contains arbitrary deci-
sions about what costs are variable for each program alternative. 
Arbitrary assumptions are also made about the amount of variable costs 
for each of the four counties studied. Farmers may divide their costs, 
particularly their own labor, between fi:xed and variable according 
to different criteria than those commonly used by researchers. Cost 
data used for farms in each of the four counties may not be accurate 
for a significant number of those interviewed. This problem is and 
will remain one of the major limitations of theoretical analys:is of 
farm programs. 
Another limitation of the theoretical analysis is the problem of 
production units with no production or with variable costs in ex:-:ess 
of the value of production. It is impossible to compute a payment 
that would induce their participation. Theoretically, they should 
make the transition from crops to grazing or other use for little or no 
Government payment. Hence program efficiency should be high. The 
usual solution is to assume that land not now producing crops will not 
be productive under the new program. This assumption rests on a 
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weak foundation. It is a limitation of theoretical analysis. 
There are several sources of. possible upward bi.as in the program 
;payment requirements quoted by farmers in this study. Some respondents 
were suspicious of a possible connection between the questionnaire and 
the operation of the ASCS programs. To be safe from possible payment 
limitations that might be imposed: on them in the future, they inflated 
their answers. Another influential factor at the time the interviews 
were conducted was the "feed the world" optimism of the mid 1960's. 
This expected rapid increase in demand for u. S. farm production, with 
attendant increases in farm conunodity price, caused some to look unfa-
vorably on production controls. These factors may cause the analysis 
of farmers' responses to give lower efficiency values than the 
theoretical analysis. The efficiency of long-term programs may have 
been biased downward by farmer expectations of higher prices in the 
future. 
The proper evaluation of fallow and uncultivated cropland is a 
problem with both methods of analysis. In those cases where fallow 
is a part of the cropping rotation, fallow land has a return in the 
amount of yield increase over continuous cropping. In othe:r:· cases some 
land is continuously uncultivated and other land continuously cropped. 
Land continuously uncultivated makes no contribution to the value of 
production. The available data did not permit an accurate assessment 
of the value of fallow land on farms in this study. 
Finally, there are the possible discrepancies between the goals 
of program efficiency, social efficiency, and distributive justic.e. 
Program efficiency is defined as removing the maximum amount of crop 
production for each dollar of program payment. Sod;.al efficiency is 
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defined as retiring those farms or parts of farms which produce at the 
highest per unit cost and thereby incr~asing the average efficiency of 
those remaining in production. Distributive justice refers to the case 
where each owner, manager, .and worker receives an adequate share of. 
the Nation's wealth. 
If the theoretical analysis is accurate, it results in both the 
maximization of program and social efficiency given that land resources 
are in excess supply. The analysis of farmers' responses appears to 
indicate that maximization of program efficiency will not necessari.ly 
1end to maximum social efficiency. The analysis overlooks the problem 
of .those who have large requirements for distributive justice, but 
little in the way of productive resources -- such as land -- that 
qualify for program participation. The most efficient control programs 
are unlikely to result in an efficient solution to the problem of 
distributive justice. However, to the extent that the use of cost-
effective supply control programs meets the needs of commercial farmers 
and free tax dollars to help marginal farmers in other ways, there is 
a complementarity between program efficiency and distributive justice. 
The farmer response analysis is believed to give the most accurate 
measure of a program's efficiency from the standpoint of supply control. 
Some alternatives were not investigated in this study but are worthy 
of consideration. An efficient supply control program could be supple-
mented with special inducements to retire marginal cropland, thereby 
improving the effect on social efficiency. Production control could 
be achieved through expenditures to divert the human resource from 
agriculture into other uses, thereby promoting distributive justice. 
Policy makers must decide whether the goals of social efficiency and 
'distributive justice are best satisfied by chasing control programs 
of lesser efficiency or by use of programs directed specifically to 
these concerns. 
93 
A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 
App, J. L., and B. Sundquist. The Feed Grain Program in Minnesota. 
Minnesota Agricultural Experiment Station Bulletin 464, University 
of Minnesota, 1963. 
Bottum, J. Carrol, et.al. Land Retirement and Farm Policy. Indiana 
Agricultural Experiment Station Bl\lletin 704, Purdue University, 
1961. 
Christensen, Raymond P., an¢ Ronala D. Aines. Economic Effects of 
Acreage Control Programs in the 1950's. Agricultural Economics 
Report No. 18, U. S. Department of Agriculture, 1962. 
Connor, Larry J., et.al. Alternative Crop Enterprises on Clay and Loam 
Soils of North Central Oklaho:ma. Oklahoma Agricultural Experiment 
Station Processed Series No. P-550, Oklahoma State University, 
1966. 
Connor, Larry J., Roy E. Hatch, and qdel Walker. Alternate Crop Enter-
prises on Loam and Sandy Soils of Northwest Oklahoma. Oklahoma 
Agricultural Experiment Station Processed Series.No. P-552, 
Oklahoma State University, 1966. 
Green, John W., Vernon R. Eidman, and Larry Peters. Alternative Irri-
gated Crop Enterprises on Clay and Sandy Loam Soils £!.. the Oklahoma 
Panhandle. Oklahoma Agricultural Experiment Station Processed 
Series No. P-554, Oklahoma State University, 1967. 
Mayer, Leo V., Earl O. Heady, and Howard C. Madsen. Farm Programs for 
the 1970's. CAED Report 32, Iowa State University, 1968. 
Oklahoma State Board of Agriculture. Annual Report for 1966. Oklahoma 
City, 1966. 
Shepherd, Geoffrey, et.al. Controlling Inputs. Missouri Agricultural 
Experiment Station Bulletin B-798, University of Missouri, 1963. 
Sobering, Fred D., and Luther G. Tweeten. 
Adjustment Analysis Applied to Wheat 
States. 11 Journal of Farm Economics, 
11A Simplified Approach to 
Producing Areas in Western 
Vol. 46 (1964), pp. 820-834. 
Squibb, John, and Jerry G. West. Participation in Government Land 
Retirement Programs in Missouri. Missouri Agricultural Experiment 
Station Bulletin SB-803, University of Missouri, 1963. 
95 
Strickland, P. Leo, and Terry Dunn. Alternate Crop Enterprise Budgets 
for Dryland Production, Southwestern Oklahoma. Oklahoma Agricul-
tural Experiment Station Process Series P-599, Oklahoma State 
University, 1969. 
Tweeten, Luther G. Commodity Programs for Agriculture. National 
Advisory Commission on Food and Fiber, Washington, D. C., 1966. 
Vermeer, James. The 1964-65 Cropland Conversion Program. Agricultural 
Economic Report No. 111, U. S. Department of Agriculture, 1967. 
Profitability of Participation in the 1962 Feed Grain 
Program in the Corn Belt. Economic Research Service Bulletin No. 
362, U. S. Department of Agriculture, 1964. 
An Economic Appraisal of the 1961 Feed Grain Program. 
Agricultural Economic Report No. 38, U. S. Department of Agricul-
ture, 1963. 
~~~~~~~-' and Rudie W. Slaughter. Analysis of_§:. General Cropland 
Retirement Program. Economic Research Service Bulletin 377, U. S. 
Department of Agriculture, 1968. 
Weisgerber, P. Productivity .2i Diverted Cropland. Economic Research 
Service Bulletin 398, U. S. Department of Agriculture, 1969. 
Af>PENDIX A 
97 
LETTER MAILED WITH QUESTIONNAIRE 
Your help is needed in a research project being conducted by 
Oklahoma State University to improve government farm programs. This 
study is a cooperative project with the U. S. Department of Agriculture 
and is under the supervision of Dr. Luther Tweeten and myself. 
Four counties -- Grant, Harper, Texas, and Tillman -- have been 
selected from the important agricultural areas of Oklahoma. In these 
four counties, you and 249 other wheat and feed grain producers will be 
contacted. The purpose of the interview will be to get your reaction 
to past programs and to obtain suggestions on possible new wheat and 
feed grain programs. Only one out of each 14 farmers in your county 
will be contacted, so your opinion is very important. You will want 
your point of view to be represented. 
The purpose of the survey is to get accurate information about 
what you prefer and what your reaction is toward different possible 
programs. The identity of each cooperator will remain confidential. 
No individual farm data will be revealed to the ASCS or any other 
agency. 
We are enclosing a questionnaire which we ask you to fill out at 
your convenience. It will probably take less than an hour. One of us 
will call you within the next week to arrange an appointment to pick 
up the completed questionnaire. At the time of our visit with you, 
we will have some further questions dealing with your opinion about 
some proposed new farm programs. By answering the enclosed questions 
now, the length of our interview with you will be held to a minimum. 
Sincerely, 
A. Barry Carr 
Agricultural Economist 
SAMPLE QUESTIONNAIRE 
OKLAHOMA AGRICULTURAL EXPERIMENT STATION 
In Cooperation with 
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE 
ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE 
STUDY OF GOVERNMENT FARM PROGRAMS 
Part 1 
Your name (farm operator) 
Your age--------
Are you married? Yes I I No /-/ 
...,.._,.. 
Number of children at home under 12 __ , 13 to 20 
Do you farm full time I / or part time / / 
over 20 
Do you plan to farm for the next five years? Yes I / No I I 
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Do you share the management of this farm with a partner? Yes I I No / I 
I 
How many years have you been farming -----
Circle the number wh:Lch Indicates the last year of school you have 
finished: Elementary: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8; 
High School: 1, 2, 3, 4; College: 1, 2, 3, 4. 
We would like to _know which farm organizations you have been a member of any 
time during the last five years. In column 1, check the organizations to 
which you have belonged. In column 2, check the organizations in which you 
have been an officer. In columns 3, 4, and 5, check the column which best 
indicates how often you attended the meetings. 
Meeting Attendance 
Member Officer Often Occasionally Never or Seldom 
Organization (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Grange 
Farmers Union 
Farm Bureau 
Grain Co-op Board 
SCS District Board 
FHA Committee 
ASCS Committee 
Wheat Growers' Assoc. 
Cattlemen's Assoc. 
Other (write in) 
\C 
IQ 
ioo 
We would like your opinion as to what a wheat and feed grain program 
should accomplish. Indicate whether you agree or disagree with each 
statement by circling one of the numbers from 1 t.o S to the left of each 
statement that corresponds with your attitude. 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
Keep farmer's cost of producing wheat .and. feed 
grains low. 
Keep wheat and feed grain prices at parity. 
Keep bread and meat prices low. 
Assure wheat and feed grains produqers parity 
income. 
Give farmers freedom ~o produce and mai-ket as 
much as they wish. 
Keep the government cost of programs low. 
Other (fill in)------~_.._....,... ____ .....,.. 
What do you like best about present government farm programs? 
What are your main criticisms of present government farm programs? 
What changes would you like to see in the way progr~ms are adminis~ere4 
by the local ASCS? 
J,01 
The following programs have been proposed as ways to deal with the farm 
problem. If the programs could be made to work, would you approve or 
disapprove? Circle one of the numbers from 1 to S to the left of each 
statement that most nearly expresses your attitude. 
1 2 3 
1 2 3 
1 2 3 
1 2 3 
1 2 3 
1 2 3 
1 2 3 
1 2 3 
4 5 
4 5 
4 5 
4 5 
4 5 
4 5 
4 5 
4 5 
An organization of farmers themselves. (inde• 
pendent of the government) would control pro-
duction so as to raise f~rm prices and in~me. 
A farmer would submit sealed bids to the ASCS 
showing the payment required for him to 
divert land from production. 11le ASCS would 
accept those bids from farmers that would 
remove the most production per dollar spent 
by the government. 
The government would buy whole farms and cQm-
bine several farms to be used for public 
recreation or leased for grazing. 
The government would lease the rights tp grow 
wheat crops and feed grains on a farm. Then 
this farm could no longer grow wheat or feed 
grains for the life of the lease. The owner 
could use the land for any other purpose, 
including the production of oth~r crops. 
Wheat and feed grain allotments could be 
bought and sold among farmers, so that allot-
ments would eventually end up in the hands of 
those who would make the best use of them. 
All government controls a~d price supports 
would be terminated, and the farm economy 
would be on a free market. . · 
Wheat and feed grains would be under a volun-
tary acreage diversion program. Each indivi-
dual farmer would be free to decide each year 
if he wants to receive payments to divert Jand 
from his crop allotment and be eligible for 
price supports. 
Wheat and feed grains would be subje~t to man~ 
datory acreage controls of the type used for 
wheat before 1964. All farmers. would be re- . 
quired to comply with allotments if approved 
in a national referendum. 
i 
What would you consider to be a fair or equilable price 
your production costs stay at their present level? 
for wheat if 
$ per bu. 
102 
Do you think the Government should support the price of wheat? 
Yes I I No I I If YES: 
At what level should the Government support the price of wheat? 
$ per bu. 
What do you expect the average price to be for the wheat you harvest in 
1968? $ per bu. 
What do you expect the average price to be for the wheat you harvest 5 
years from now? $ per bu. 
What would you consider to be a fair or equitable price for grain sor-
ghum if your production costs stay at their present level? 
$ per cwt. 
Do you think the Government should support the price of grain sorghum? 
Yes 
_/_ I No I I If YES: 
At what level should the Government support the price of grain sorghum? 
$ per cwt. 
If price projections indicate that the price of wheat would be substan-
tially below the fair price given in 03.34, woulE_you favor a free 
market? Yes I I No I I Undecided _/~/ 
If price projections indicate that the price of grain sorghum would be 
substantially below the fair price___g!ven in 03.38, would you favor a 
free market? Yes I I No _/~/ Undecided I I 
Given the acreage of cropland that you have in 1967, how many acres of 
wheat and grain sorghum would you plant for harvest if we had no acreage 
restrictions or price supports, and prices were as follows: (Prices of 
livestock and all other feed grains remain at present levels.) 
Acres I would plant 
with no control 
Wheat ($ per bu.) Grain Sorghum ($ per cwt.) Wheat Grain Sorghum 
1.00 1.00 
1.50 1.50 
2.00 2.00 
2.50 2.50 
Date 
~~~~~~~---En um er at or 
-------Farm No. 
---~----County 
---------
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Name of operator 
~---~~----~~~---~~~~~~----~ 
Address of operator 
~--~--~------~-------~----
Telephone of operator 
------~-~----~-~--~------
FARM AND PROGRAM INFORMATION, 1967 
ASCS Farm Number 
Item Total 
Farm land acres 
Crop land acres 
Conserving base acres 
Permitted crop acres 
1967 ALLOTMENT - BASE 
Wheat, acres 
Barley, acres 
Feed grain, acres 
Cotton, acres 
Oat-Rye, acres 
ASCS 1967 PROJECTED YIELD 
Corn, bu. 
Grain sorghum, bu. 
Wheat, bu. 
Cotton. lbs. 
Acres irrigated 
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ASCS Farm Number 
Item 
Is this farm rented in? 
Cash rent. $ per acre? 
Landlord's share of crop? % 
Landlord's ~hare of expense? 
Seed, fert .• harvest $/acre 
Was this farm in the 1967 
wheat program? 
Maximum acres land suit-
able for wheat? 
Total production if max. 
acreage planted? bu. 
Was this farm in the 
1967 feed gr. program? 
Maximum acres land suit-'-
able for gr. sorghum. 
Total production if max. 
acreage planted to grain 
sorghum? bu. 
How·many acres of whe~t 
were substitute9. for 
feed gr. base in '67? 
How many acres of gr. 
sorg. were substituted 
for wheat allotment '67? 
How many acres of wheat 
were substituted for 
barley base in 1967? 
How many acres of wheat 
were substituted for· 
oats & rye base in 1967? 
At the time you 
you fully aware 
program? 
planted wheat or feed grain for harvest in 1967, were 
of the ~sibilities of substitution under the present 
Yes _I _I No _/ _/ 
What were your reasons for (or for not) using the substitution provision 
between wheat and feed grains in 1967? 
USE OF NON-IRRIGATED LAND IN 1967 
Show Acreage Harvested Crops 
I Farm fl Farm fl Farm fl Farm fl Total Item Acres Acres Acres Acres Acres 
Corn, grain 
Grain sorghum 
Corn or sorg. forage 
Wheat 
Barley 
Oats 
Rye 
Cotton 
Other crops: 
Tame Rav 
Cropland pastured 
Diverted cropland 
Fallow. idle. failure 
TOTAL DRY CROPLAND 
Total irrigated cropland 
TOTAL CROPLAND 
What would farm land of the type in the farms above sell for in your community? 
$ per acre. 
I-' 
0 
IJ1 
SOIL CLASSIFICATION AND YIELDS 
The quality and yield potential of soils varies from field to field even on the same farm. Consider the 
non-irrigated cropland on each farm. Set up one category in which you would include your best cropland. 
Set up another category which would include your poorest cropland. A third category should be set up to 
include the land between the best and the poorest. Show the normal dryland yield per planted acre that 
you would expect for each category if the entire acreage were planted to the indicated crop. For pasture 
yields show the number of animal units (1 A. U. = 1 cow and calf, or 2 weaned calves) that could be 
maintained per 100 acres of permanent pasture for 1 full year with no roughage supplement. Show your 
per acre production costs in each category for the crops indicated. Production costs should include 
seed, fertilizer, hired labor, chemicals, machinery repairs and fuel, custom harvesting and hauling. 
Exclude from production costs the operator labor, unpaid family labor and land costs. 
Acreage of Cropland Wheat Gr. Sorghum Pasture 
Land Category Farm II Farmll Farmll Farm/I Total Yield Cost Yield Cost Yield Cost 
TOTAL xx xx xx xx xx xx 
...... 
0 
°' 
What payment per acre would you require to voluntarily divert from production to soil conserving use the 
following categories of land for the indicated periods of time. Your present crop base allotments would 
remain unchanged, but you would have to maintain your present conserving base in addition to the acreage 
diverted. You would have the choice of what crop acreages were reduced to stay within the permitted crop 
acreage. Grazing may or may not be permitted. 
1 Year Diversion 10 Year Diversion 
With Grazing Without Grazing With Grazing Without Grazing 
What payment per acre to divert the best 
category above. $ per acre 
What payment per acre, to divert the 
poorest category above. $ per acre 
If you diverted the acreage given in 08.07 for one year, how much would your wheat acreage be reduced? 
acres 
If you diverted the acreage given in 08.08 for one year, how much would your wheat acreage be reduced? 
acres 
.... 
0 
"'-J 
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VOLUNTARY PROGRAM ALTERNATIVES 
Suppose you have a choice of participating in a wheat program at differ-
ent levels of diversion from your present 1967 wheat allotment. How 
many acres would you voluntarily divert to soil conserving use on a 
one-year basis with the price support loan levels and diversion pay-
ment rates shown? The diversion payment would be the ¢ per bu. 
indicated times your 1967 projected per acre yield. There would be no 
marketing certificate payment on your production. You would be re-
quired to stay within your 1967 wheat allotment, plus any substitution 
with feed grains, barley, oats, or rye, to be eligible for support 
loans. The diverted acreage could not be used for grazing. 
Acres Diverted From 1967 Wheat Base 
ASCS Farm Number 
Loan and Diversion Payment Total 
Loan Level $1. 25 per bu. 
Diversion pay. ¢ per bu. 
on pro_; . yield 50¢ 
75¢ 
100¢ 
Loan Level $2.00 per bu. 
Diversion pay. ¢ per bu. 
on proi. yield 50¢ 
75¢ 
100¢ 
At what diversion pay-' 
ment rate per acre would 
you divert the entire 
allotment for 1 year? 
Loan Level $1.25 per bu. 
Loan Level $2.00 per bu. 
109 
Indicate below the acreage of your 1967 grain sorghum base that you 
would voluntarily divert for one year under the same conditions as 
stated in the previous question for wheat. No grazing would be allowed 
on the.diverted acreage. -
Acres Diverted From 1967 Sorghum Base 
ASCS Farm Number 
Loan and Diversion Payment Total 
Loan Level $1.25 per cwt. 
Diversion pay. ¢ per cwt. 
on proi. yield 50¢ 
75¢ 
100¢ 
Loan Level $2.00 per cwt. 
Diversion pay. ¢ per cwt. 
on proi. yield 50¢ 
75¢ 
100¢ 
At what diversion payment 
rate per acre would you 
divert the entire allotment 
for 1 year? 
Loan Level $1.25 per cwt. 
' 
Loan Level $2.00 per cwt. 
Suppose you are faced with a program that will allow you to voluntarily 
divert to soil conserving use for 5 to 10 years the indicated base or 
allotments. You would not be allowed to harvest a crop from the land 
during the period and would not be allowed to graze. You would be re-
quired to maintain your normal conserving base in addition to th~ 
allotment or base diverted. You could not grow the crop corresponding 
to the allotment or base diverted on the participating farm. What pay-
ment per acre would you require for the farm that you own? 
Allotment or Base Payment Per Acre 
and Contract Time ASCS Farm II 
Wheat Allotment Years 
5 
10 
Sorghum Base 5 
10 
All Cropland 5 
10 
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Suppose there was a government program that would give you a non-
interest, non-recourse loan to remove your cropland from agricultural 
production. As long as you keep the loan you could not crop the land. 
You could sell the land, subject to the no-cropping restriction, or 
you could use it for non-agricultural purposes. Any time you wished 
to repay the loan without interest you could do so and resume produc-
tion. If the land were never used for agricultural purposes the loan 
need never be repaid. In a national emergency of short crop supplies, 
the government could release the land for cropping on a temporary 
basis. For the farm that you own, what size loan per acre of cropland 
would you require to put the entire cropland into retirement? 
Grazing Status 
$ Per Acre of Cropland To Retire All Cropland 
ASCS Farm ff 
---
Grazin ermitted 
No ermitted 
What loan per acre would you require to retire the indicated category 
of land that you own listed in question 08.00. Present allotments 
and bases remain unchanged but you must maintain your present conserv-
ing base in addition to the acreage retired. No grazing permitted. 
Category of Land $ Loan Per Acre 
Best in 08.00 
Poorest in 08.00 
Suppose the government had a program to raise farm commodity prices and 
farm income by purchasing land and diverting it from production. Such 
land would be used for public recreation or leased back for grazing. 
If offered an adequate price would you consider selling any of the land 
you own under this arrangement? Yes _/_/ No _/_/ 
For the farm that you are the owner, what price per acre would you 
require to sell the following at the end of the 1967 cropping year? 
Mineral rights are excluded from the sale. 
Items to be Sold 
Total farm buildin s, and houses 
Cropland, allotments, and bases 
on! 
Sale Price in $ Per Acre 
ASCS Farm ff 
---
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What price per acre would you require to sell the indicated category of 
land that you listed in question 08.00. Your present 1967 allotments 
and bases would be unchanged, but you must maintain your present con-
serving base. You may not have sufficient cropland to grow your entire 
allotment and base. 
Category of Land . Sale Price in $ Per Acre 
Best land in 08.00 
Poorest land in 08.00 
About how many days did you work off the farm in 1966? days 
Check the principal source of your off farm income in 1966, if any. 
Property rental I I 
Stocks, bonds, saving accts. I I 
Social security or pension I I 
Custom work I / 
Salary job or wage I I 
Business 
Other ( ) 
-------· 
Check the category which would include the total off farm income in 
1966 of yourself and the dependent members of your family living with 
you. 
None I I 
$1 - 499 I I 
$500 - 999 I I 
$1000 - 1999 I I 
$2000 - 4999 I I 
Over $5000 I I 
If you were to quit farming, how would you rate your possibilities for 
income in a non-farm job as compared to the incom~ou have bee_!L1!!aking 
from farming? Better off _/_/ Worse off _/_/ Same _/_/ 
In 1966, check the category which includes your total gross farm income 
from all farming operations, including your government payments. 
Under $2500 I I 
$2500 - 4999 I I 
$5000 - 9999 I I 
$10,000 - 19,ooo I I 
$20,000 - 39,ooo I I 
Over $40,000 I I 
In 1966, check the category which includes your net farm income from all 
farming operations, as defined on Schedule F of your federal income tax 
return. 
Under $0 
$0 - 999 
$1000 - 2999 _I _I 
$3000 - 6999 I I 
Over $7000 I I 
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How many man-weeks did you work on the farm in 1966? 
How many man-weeks of unpaid family labor did you use on the farm in 
1966? 
--~~~~~~~~ 
How many man-weeks of hired labor did you use on the farm in 1966? 
The following statements are sometimes made about government farm policy 
and farming in general. Indicate whether you agree or disagree with 
each statement by circling one of the numbers from 1 to 5 to the left 
of each statement. 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
The government would pay farmers for long term 
(10 or' 20 years) land retirement. There 
would be no acreage controls on specific crops, 
but the amount of cropland available for farm-
ing would be reduced by the amount of land 
retired. 
Continue the present wheat and feed grain pro-
grams with price supports loan and marketing 
certificates for wheat. 
The government should support farm prices, but 
it shouldn't try to tell a farmer what and how 
much to produce. 
Farmers could easily organize themselves to 
control production and raise prices. 
The federal government should not get involved 
in such projects as electric power and housing. 
Instead of raising taxes, Congress should try 
to reduce federal spending. 
The federal government ought to see to it that 
anyone who wants to work can find a job. 
Government relief programs have gotten to be 
too large. 
The federal government should do more to help 
small towns and cities build the schools they 
need. 
One job of government is to see that people 
are free to run their business as they please. 
Present government farm programs are contrary 
to the free enterprise system. 
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1 2 3 4 5 Keeping up on the latest feeding and ferti-
lizing practices is more important than keep-
ing up on farm programs. 
1 2 3 4 5 The government should see that every farmer 
makes a decent living. 
1 2 3 4 5 A family is better off to stay on the farm 
even though there is a higher paying job 
available in town. 
1 2 3 4 5 It's important for the government to provide 
an opportunity to farm for all boys who want 
to farm. 
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TABLE XXXI 
THEORETICAL RANKING OF GOVERNMENT PURCHASE OF ALL CROPLAND BY THREE PERCENT LAND INCREMENTS 
Use of Land in 19671 Acres Allotments and Bases 1 Acres 
Grain Forage Hay and Feed Barley Projected Yields 
Sorghum Sorghum Wheat Barley Pasture Cotton Fallow Grain Wheat Oats, Rye Cotton Sorghum Wheat Cotton 
Wheat §2.00 
0 lll 2,533 106 129 18 145 273. 2,221· 333 .25 29.4 18.8 252 
219 132 4,746 171 289 108 367 710 3,949 770 152 33.3 20.5 244 
266 183 7,060 243 525 174 580 988 5,936 1,056 260 31.3 21.1 261 
266 291 9,384 420 634 297 844 1,239 8,026 1,306 442 30.5 21.6 259 
286 291 ll,437 .758 677 401 1,262 1,373 9,869 1,522 582 30.6 22.5 258 
341 326 13,663 769 774 401 1,710 1,512 ll,900 1,747 582 30.9 23.2 25~ 
731 326 16,521 789 901 401 1,974 2,099 14,444 2,007 582 30.4 23~1 258 
877 326 18,336 789 1,005 401 2,318 2,426 16,059 2,184 582 31.1 23.4 258 
Wheat §1.25 
219 20 l,8ll 96 158 37 365 664 1,738 81 55 32.1 19.7 267 
219 141 4,274 171 287 172 624 757 3,885 557 253 31.6 20.0 270 
334 153 6,402 191 630 300 824 1,007 5,553 987 436 31.4 20.9 211 · 
531 355 8,015 419 859 529 1,188 1,195 7,217 1,195 816 32.1 21.7 272 
837 370 10,032 485 951 542 1,549 1,689 9,083 1,329 830 33.3 22.7 271 
1,357 405 12,558 496 l,ll7 542 1, 758 2,402 ll,479 1,586 830 33.5 22.4 271 
1,357 405 14,565 516 1,170 542 2,227 2,468 13,259 1,765 830 32.6 22.8 271 
1,550 435 16,908 516 1,319 542 2,414 2,744 15,294 2,056 830 31.9 23.3 271 
..... 
..... 
V1 
TABLE XX.XII 
THEORETICAL RANKING OF GOVERNMENT PURCHASE OF POOREST CROPLAND 
BY THREE PERCENT LAND INCREMENTS 
Percent Use of Land in 1967, Acres 
of All Grain Forage Hay and 
Cropland Sorghum Sorghum Wheat Barley Pasture Cotton Fallow 
Wheat $2.00 
3 521 85 1,225 102 356 0 664 
6 823 184 2,437· 239 660 0 1,558 
9 894 266 3,565 586 1,038 0 2,526 
Wheat $1. 25 
3 684 101 770 224 496 0 685 
6 797 212 2,162 399 829 0 1,452 
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TABLE XXXIII 
THEORETICAL RANKING OF CROPPING EASEMENT ON ALL CROPLAND BY THREE PERCENT LAND INCREMENTS 
Use of Land in 1967 2 Acres Allotments and Bases 2 Acres 
Grain Forage Hay and Feed Barley Projected Yields 
Sorghum Sorghum Wheat Barley Pasture Cotton Fallow Grain Wheat Oats, Rye Cotton Sorghum Wheat Cotton 
Wheat ~2.00 
56 62 496 30 260 497 1,335 287 910 293 714 36.2 26.7 282 
296 108 2,368 274 305 760 2,262 693 2,700 414 1,136 37.5 . 23.9 285 
646 108 3,238 330 575 1,023 2,882 1,108 3,881 500 1,490 38.0 23.6 284 
872 399 4,765 352 799 1,023 3,730 1,564 5,842 553 1,490 35.8 22.6 284 
900 602 6, 754 487 1,006 1,023 4,ii4 2,070 7,596 731 1,490 34.4 22.6 284 
962 742 8,621 556 1,302 1,023 4,421 2,546 9,482 954 1,490 33.6 21.9 284 
1,222 1,052 10,175 652 1,366 1,023 5,309 3,169 11,535 992 1,490 32.8 21. 7 284 
1,355 1,205 11,589 793 1, 709 1,023 6,003 3,579 13,524 1,186 1,490 32.4 21.6 284 
Wheat ~1.25 
38 22 1,651 14 58 134 1,109 304 1,873 159 220 37.4 21.4 291 
38 63 3,187 14 136 328 2,311 411 3,606 472 521 36.3 23.0 286 
182 153 4,472 254 276 686 2,969 755 4,820 536 1,014 37.0 23.7 283 
182 253 6,285 264 431 803 3,565 992 6,522 824 1,172 35.3 23.5 281 
217 513 8,358 312 671 803 3,943 1,442 8,453 984 1,172 33.6 23.0 281 
259 590 10,596 505 709 803 4,388 1,652 10,567 1,144 1,172 33.3 22.6 281 
459 709 12,293 610 808 803 5,133 1,997 12,568 1,338 1,172 33.4 22.7 281 
525 822 14,568 681 910 803 5,438 2,320 14,565 1,705 1,172 32.7 22.8 281 
...... 
...... 
" 
TABLE XXXIV 
THEORETICAL RANKING OF CROPPING EASEMENT ON POOREST CROPLAND 
BY THREE PERCENT LAND INCREMENTS 
Percent Use of Land in 1967 2 Acres 
of All Grain Forage Hay and 
Cropland Sorghum Sorghum Wheat Barley Pasture Cotton Fallow 
Wheat $2.00 
3 60 201 718 491 738 0 757 
6 715 362 1,521 646 1,190 0 1,492 
9 883 362 3,007 666 1,252 0 2,736 
12 944 410 3,723 666 2,017 0 4,090 
Wheat $1.25 
3 45 113 935 432 600 0 929 
6 184 228 2,125 646 780 0 1,945 
9 735 286 2,942 666 1,189 0 3,03;1. 
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TABLE XXXV 
THEORETICAL RANKING OF TEN-YEAR RETIREMENT OF ALL CROPLAND BY THREE PERCENT LAND INCREMENTS · 
Use of Land in 19671 Acres Allotments and Bases 1 Acres 
Grain Forage Hay and Feed Barley Projected Yields 
Sorghum Sorghum Wheat Barley Pasture Cotton Fallow Grain Wheat Oats, Rye Cotton Sorghum Wheat Cott'on 
Wheat ~2.00 
56 171 428 30 260 479 1,584 331 1,075 266 685 34.4 25.0 281 
296 217 . 1,840 274 358 790 2,286 736 2,357 422 1,183 36.6 25.4 283 
296 217 3,180 330 655 1,028 2,958 868 3,772 468 1,503 36.6 24.2 285 
806 362 4,474 350 705 1,028 3,917 1,419 5,592 521 1,503 36.8 22.8 285 
885 613 6,422 398 1,122 1,028 4,421 2,030 7,665 717 1,503 33.7 22.0. 285 
920 851 8,212 556 1,382 1,028 4,761 2,475 9,389 911 1,503 33.4 22.0 285 
1,162 918 10,128 716 1,382 1,028 5,403 2,866 11,485 956 1,503 33.4 21.6 285 
1,354 1,221 11,462 751 1,512 1,028 6,433 3,448 13,585 1,166 1,503 32.4 21.6· 285 
Wheat ~l.25 
0 109 1,583 14 44 116 1,164 312 1,844 129 191 36.2 20.9 298 
38 177 2,525 20 146 .356 2,436 483 3,230 430 568 35.0 23.0 286 
38 232 4,217 130 322 677 3,208 723 4,769 587 1,001 35.l 22.9 284 
182 287 6,009 287 481 796 3,823 1,001 6,542 740 1,171 34.8 23.3 284 
217 608 8,042 335 638 796 4,200 1,460 8,424 927 1,171 33.3 23.0 284 
217 723 10,131 528 777 796 4,522 1,651 10,395 1,030 1,171 32.7 22.6 284 
259 845 12,278 702 824 ~ .. 796 4,9% 1,844 12,475 1,407 1,171 32.8 23.0 284 
525 894 14,171 704 936 796 5,646 2,300 14,476 1,621 1,171 32.8 22.9 284 
I-' 
I-' 
\0 
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TABLE X:XXVI 
THEORETICAL RANKING OF TEN-YEAR RETIREMENT OF POOREST CROPLAND 
BY THREE PERCENT LAND INCREMENTS 
Percent Use of Land in 1967 2 Acres 
of All Grain Forage Hay and 
Cropland Sorghum Sorghum Wheat Barley Pasture Cotton Fallow 
Wheat $2.00 
3 60 333 536 391 726 0 933 
6 715 409 1,318 725 1,134 0 1,577 
9 883 494 2,805 745 1,229 0 2,750 
12 944 517 3,705 745 1,763 0 4,237 
Wheat $1.25 
3 15 272 729 492 573 0 904 
6 102 418 1,985 725 887 0 1,788 
9 641 464 2,893 745 1,009 0 3,105 
12 944 542 3,501 745 1,873 0 4,203 
TABLE X:XXVII 
THEORETICAL RANKING OF TEN-YEAR RETIREMENT OF POOREST CROPLAND 
WITH GRAZING PERMITTED BY THREE PERCENT LAND INCREMENTS 
Percent Use of Land in 1967 2 Acres 
of All Grain Forage Hay and 
Cropland Sorghum Sorghum Wheat Barley Pasture Cotton Fallow 
Wheat ~2.00 
3 514 111 982 244 444 0 717 
6 842 242 2,390 413 708 0 1,356 
Wheat $1.25 
3 640 153 747 378 585 0 486 
TABLE XXXVIII 
THEORETICAL RANKING OF TEN-YEAR RETIREMENT OF WHEAT 
ALLOTMENTS BY THREE PERCENT LAND INCREMENTS 
Percent of Projected 
All Cropland Wheat Acreage Wheat Yield 
Wheat $2.00 
3 2,357 22.5 
6 5,582 21.9 
9 9,103 22.8 
12 12,143 23.0 
15 15' 117 23.4 
18 18,288 23.4 
21 21,026 23.1 
24 24,002 22.7 
Wheat $1. 25 
3 2,929 22.6 
6 5, 922 22.0 
9 8,825 22.9 
12 11,792 23.0 
15 14,744 23.4 
18 17,855 23.4 
21 20,805 23.1 
24 23,684 22.7 
TABLE XX.XIX 
THEORETICAL RANKING OF TEN-YEAR RETIREMENT 
OF FEED GRAIN BASES BY THREE 
PERCENT LAND INCREMENTS 
Percent Grain Forage Projected 
of All Sorghum Sorghum Sorghum 
Cropland Acreage Acreage Yield 
3 682 1,786 28.7 
6 2,989 1,943 31.0 
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TABLE XL 
THEORETICAL RANKING OF ONE-YEAR RETIREMENT OF POOREST CROPLAND 
BY THREE PERCENT LAND INCREMENTS 
Percent Use of Land in 1967 2 Acres 
of All Grain Forage Hay and 
Cropland Sorghum Sorghum Wheat Barley Pasture Cotton Fallow 
Wheat $2.00 
3 42 301 591 465 696 0 848 
6 199 448 1,821 725 9,959 0 1,781 
9 883 494 2,898 745 1,146 0 2, 719 
12 944 542 3, 773 745 1,696 0 4,236 
Wheat 21.25 
3 15 272 836 374 571 0 900 
6 60 418 2,074 687 862 0 1,816 
9 306 476 3,195 745 1,021 0 3,172 
12 944 542 3,663 745 1,769 0 4,221 
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TABLE XLI 
THEORETICAL RANKING OF ONE-YEAR RETIREMENT OF WHEAT 
ALLOTMENTS BY THREE PERCENT LAND INCREMENTS 
Percent of Projected 
All Cropland Wheat Acreage Wheat Yield 
Wheat $2.00 
3 2,326 22.2 
6 5,583 22.0 
9 9,194 21.3 
12 12,138 21. 7 
15 15,155 22.6 
18 18,193 22.9 
21 21,117 22.8 
24 24,462 22.8 
Wheat $1. 25 
3 2,308 22.3 
6 5,565 22.0 
9 9,194 22.8 
12 12,120 22.8 
15 15,260 23.4 
18 18,175 23.7 
21 21,099 23.4 
24 24,444 23.3 
TABLE XLII 
THEORETICAL RANKING OF ONE-YEAR RETIREMENT 
OF FEED GRAIN BASES .BY THREE 
PERCENT LAND INCREMENTS 
Percent Grain Forage Projected 
of All Sorghum Sorghum Sorghum 
Cropland Acreage Acreage Yield 
3 394 1,942 28.8 
6 2,579 2,274 30.5 
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TABLE XLIII 
INDICATED RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT PURCHASE OF ENTIRE CROPLAND 
Use of Land in 1967, Acres Allotments and Bases, Acres 
Grain Forage Hay and Feed Barley 
Sorghum Sorghum Wheat Barley Pasture Cotton Fallow Grain Wheat Oats, Rye Cotton 
Wheat $2.00 
0 70 2,410 11 13 116 360 201 2,165 464 19 
Wheat $1.25 
0 70 2,216 11 13 116 360 201 2,033 402 19 
Projected Yields 
Sorghum Wheat Cotton 
27.2 28.2 245 
27.2 28.4 245 
I-' 
N 
\JI 
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TABLE XLIV 
INDICATED RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT PURCHASE OF POOREST CROPLAND 
Percent Use of Land in 1967~ Acres 
of All Grain Forage Hay and 
Cropland Sorghum Sorghum Wheat Barley Pasture Cotton Fallow 
Wheat ~2.00 
0.1 0 0 82 0 0 0 50 
Wheat $1. 25 
0.1 0 0 79 0 0 0 50 
Percent 
of all 
Cropland 
3 
6 
9 
12 
15 
3 
6 
9 
12 
TABLE XLV 
INDICATED RESPONSE TO CROPPING EASEMENT ON ENTIRE CROPLAND BY THREE PERCENT LAND INCREMENTS 
Use of Land in 1967 2 Acres Allotments and Bases 2 Acres 
Grain Forage Hay and Feed Barley Projected Yields 
Sorghum Sorghum Wheat Barley Pasture Cotton Fallow Grain Wheat Oats, Rye Cotton Sorghum Wheat Cotton 
Wheat $2.00 
219 0 1,961 0 72 0 659 265 1,836 132 0 37.7 19.9 0 
219 85 4,197 0 112 13 1,312 482 3,934 322 14 34.2 20.4 220 
249 179 6,515 274 192 26 1,524 663 6,171 453 33 33.2 23.2 234 
434 279 8,505 274 758 26 2,034 1,292 8,325 796 33 31. 7 22.9 234 
483 299 10,575 294 906 26 2,219 1,404 10,148 1,086 33 32.0 24.1 234 
Wheat ~1.25 
219 0 1,915 0 72 0 640 265 1,790 132 0 37.7 19.9 0 
219 171 4,098 0 112 0 1,285 507 3,871 286 0 33.7 20.2 0 
434 211 5,893 274 692 13 1,699 1,102 6,027 371 14 32.6 22.0 220 
434 279 8,204 274 781 26 2,028 1,263 8,112 747 33 32.0 23.0 234 
I-' 
l'V 
-..J 
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TABLE XLVI 
INDICATED RESPONSE TO CROPPING EASEMENT ON POOREST CROPLAND 
Percent Use of Land in 1967, Acres 
of All Grain Forage Hay and 
Cropland Sorghum Sorghum Wheat Barley Pasture Cotton Fallow 
Wheat $2.00 
0.2 0 0 115 20 29 0 47 
Wheat $L25 
0.1 0 0 45 20 29 0 0 
Percent 
of all 
Cropland 
3 
6 
9 
12 
15 
·18 
21 
24 
3 
6 
9 
12 
15 
18 
TABLE XLVII 
INDICATED RESPONSE TO TEN-YEAR RETIREMENT OF ENTIRE CROPLAND BY THREE PERCENT LAND INCREMENTS 
Use of Land in 1967 2 Acres Allotments and Bases 1 Acres 
Grain Forage Hay and Feed Barley Projected Yields 
Sorghum Sorghum Wheat Barley Pasture Cotton Fallow Grain Wheat Oats, Rye Cotton Sorghum Wheat Cotton 
Wheat $2.00 
421 18 1,851 91 186 1.52 443 550 1,804 122 221 33.1 23.6 292 
497 103 3,868 276 266 197 710 807 3,688 258 295 32.0 24.0 267 
497 178 5,829 461 320 256 907 971 5,462 516 388 31.2 24.4 241 
515 178 8,582 527 493 339 1,225 1,1.53 7,571 1,185 505 31.0 24.2 245 
552 222 10,839 724 689 394 1,470 1,256 9,645 1,548 577 31.2 25.5 247 
618 284 12,913 778 937 477 1,756 1,510 ll,367 1,878 703 31.1 25.8 253 
704 305 14,925 778 1,000 582 2,440 1,714 13,264 2,040 836 30.9 25.4 257 
1,235 325 16,434 820 1,177 741 2,952 2,229 14,960 2,085 1,046 32.2 24.8 260 
Wheat $1.25 
485 10 1,430 111 210 227 478 566 1,487 0 330 33.2 22.5 264 
552 ll8 3,286 349 355 292 759 832 3,252 253 433 31.9 23.7 260 
552 208 5,491 533 542 389 1,150 1,036 5,306 467 573 31.4 25.1 266 
681 240 7,880 535 727 422 1,386 1,352 7,169 1,003 621 31.5 24.2 265 
733 250 9,714 674 830 700 1,795 1,596 8,781 1,277 984 31.9 24.9 268 
1,067 284 11,834 756 930 700. 2,104 2,001 10,636 1,585 984 33.5 25.4 268 
I-' 
N 
l.O 
TABLE XLVIII 
INDICATED RESPONSE TO TEN-YEAR RETIREMENT OF POOREST CROPLAND 
Percent Use of Land in 1967 2 Acres 
of All Grain Forage Hay and 
Cropland Sorghum Sorghum Wheat Barley Pasture Cotton Fallow 
Wheat $2.00 
0.6 18 32 306 8 164 0 17 
Wheat $1.25 
0.5 18 32 229 8 164 0 6 
TABLE XLIX 
INDICATED RESPONSE TO TEN-YEAR RETIREMENT OF POOR~ST CROPLAND 
WITH GRAZING ALLOWED 
Percent Use of Land in 1967z Acres 
of All Grain Forage Hay and 
Cropland Sorghum Sorghum Wheat Barley Pasture Cotton Fallow 
Wheat $2.00 
0.5 0 8 341 6 81 0 31 
Wheat $1.25 
0.4 0 8 238 0 81 0 20 
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TABLE L 
INDICATED RESPONSE TO TEN-YEAR RETIREMENT OF WHEAT 
ALLOTMENTS BY THREE PERCENT LAND INCREMENTS 
Percent of Projected 
All Cropland Wheat Acreage Wheat Yield 
Wheat $2.00 
3 3,680 21.0 
6 7,160 22.0 
9 10,462 24.0 
12 13,448 24.3 
15 16,784 24.3 
18 20,331 24.2 
21 22,859 23.6 
24 25,585 23.3 
Wheat $1.25 
3 3,680 21.3 
6 7,055 21.6 
9 10,462 24.1 
12 13,494 24.4 
15 16,913 23.9 
18 20,265 24.2 
TABLE LI 
INDICATED RESPONSE TO TEN-YEAR RETIREMENT 
OF FEED GRAIN BASES 
Percent Grain Forage Projected 
of All Sorghum Sorghum Sorghum 
Cropland Acreage Acreage Yield 
1. 8 1,647 327 35.9 
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TABLE LII 
INDICATED RESPONSE TO ONE-YEAR RETIREMENT OF POOREST CROPLAND 
Percent Use of Land in 1967 2 Acres 
of All Grain Forage Hay and 
Cropland Sorghum Sorghum Wheat Barley Pasture Cotton Fallow 
Wheat: $2.00 
0.9 18 42 479 114 173 0 34 
Wheat $L25 
0.8 18 43 372 114 173 0 23 
TABLE LIII 
INDICATED RESPONSE TO ONE-YEAR RETIREMENT OF WHEAT 
ALLOTMENTS BY THREE PERCENT LAND INCREMENTS 
Percent of Projected 
All Crop land Wheat Acreage Wheat Yield 
Wheat $2.00 
3 4,246 24.1 
6 7,606 22.8 
9 10,968 23.8 
12 14,219 24.2 
15 17,492 24.8 
18 20,832 24.4 
21 23,778 24.4 
24 27,149 23.6 
Wheat $1. 25 
3 3,619 18.8 
6 7,303 21.2 
9 10, 780 21.6 
12 14,022 21. 7 
15 17,448 22.4 
18 20,427 22.3 
21 23,694 22.5 
24 26,752 22.9 
TABLE LIV 
INDICATED RESPONSE TO ONE-YEAR RETIREMENT 
OF FEED GRAIN BASES 
Percent 
of All 
Cropland 
2.2 
Grain 
Sorghum 
Acreage 
1,943 
Forage 
Sorghum 
Acreage 
286 
Projected 
Sorghum 
Yield 
36.2 
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